Start with the trade hiding inside the payment. Because different issuers' coins are not automatically interchangeable at par, a payer holding one brand often has to sell it in a secondary market and buy another before the recipient will accept the transfer [4], and since the peg can drift, particularly under stress, the payment may not clear at face value [5]. Holding a single brand does not close the gap either, because the same token sitting on different base chains and scaling layers needs a bridge that is either costly or risky [6]. The integrity complaint is softer and more supervisory: a large share of balances sits in self-custodied wallets, and many transfers happen peer to peer, outside venues applying consistent know-your-customer and anti-money-laundering checks [7].
The regulatory annex is where the direction of travel is legible. Five jurisdictions are compared on issuer rules, and Hong Kong, the UK and the EU are grouped as less restrictive because they allow some additional activities with separate authorisation, regulatory consent or other permissions [16], which leaves two of the five on the tighter side of the line [18]. De Cos's own framing is conservative in the literal sense: the existing arrangement of central bank reserves plus supervised commercial bank liabilities already delivers the properties he wants [19], and programmable ledgers can shave the remaining frictions provided the instrument running on them is designed properly [20].
Read as a claim on resource allocation, this is a bid for bank engineering budgets. A treasury that builds a deposit token is not building a branded coin, and it is also not building the secondary-market machinery, the bridges or the redemption backstop that keep a bearer token near par. That is the quiet cost of the endorsement, or rather, the more interesting version is that the endorsement is cheap for the BIS and expensive for whoever accepts it.
There are at least three ways this reads differently in two years. If enforceable par redemption in all states of the world arrives alongside credible cross-chain settlement and consistent integrity rules [14], the objection stops being institutional and becomes a delivery schedule. If banks instead ship deposit tokens on platforms that do not talk to each other, the fragmentation now blamed on public chains simply relocates inside the supervised perimeter. And the fiscal pull runs the other way entirely: large foreign demand for dollar-pegged tokens can lower sovereign borrowing costs even while it accelerates digital dollarisation elsewhere and weakens local policy transmission [10], which gives finance ministries a motive that does not match the prudential one.
This is probably wrong in its timing rather than its direction, but the falsification tests are clear enough. Show a stablecoin that redeems at par through a stress week without a secondary-market trade, or a deposit token that cannot settle to a bank on another platform. Neither appears in the material, and both become measurable the moment someone ships one.
