Skip to content

Leadership1 publisherNot yet confirmed elsewhere3 min readPublished

The SEC stopped grading proxy exclusions. Now the board's lawyers do.

Nine in ten exclusion requests now draw a no-objection letter that reflects no review of the merits, and requests fell by half. The judgement moved to the general counsel's office.

The Board Room · Leadership desk

How we use AISend a correction

Photograph accompanying The SEC stopped grading proxy exclusions. Now the board's lawyers do.
Photo: carltonfields.com

What happened

  • In November 2025 the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance stopped reviewing the merits of most Rule 14a-8 exclusion requests, issuing no-objection letters on a company's own representation.
  • Of the requests still filed, 90% came back with a no-objection response.
  • The SEC chair said six lawsuits were filed over excluded proposals, under 4% of proposals covered by exclusion notices.
  • Overall proposal filings kept declining, while governance proposals rose nearly 19% in volume.

Compiled by The Board RoomSomething wrong?How this is made

Why it matters

  • constraint A letter granted 90% of the time cannot be shown to a board or a proponent as validation of anything, so the exclusion call has to be underwritten inside the company rather than cited from outside it.
  • exposure The issuer, not the SEC staff, is now the party defending an exclusion, and the proponent's remedy is a suit naming the company.
  • contradiction The chair reads six suits against a 150-plus denominator as proof the process works; the report treats proponent litigation as a standing feature of exclusion.
  • decision With governance support down to a third of votes cast, taking a proposal to the ballot and beating it is often the cheaper route, which turns exclusion into a discretionary spend rather than a...

A response that arrives in nine cases out of ten has stopped carrying information [5]. Under the old practice, a staff letter was evidence that a regulator had looked at the merits and declined to disagree. The replacement is a receipt for the company's own representation that it had a reasonable basis to exclude [4]. The paper still comes back, but the reasoning behind it does not exist, and neither does the argument it used to hand a director who asked whether an exclusion would hold.

That is why the near-halving of exclusion requests in the Russell 3000 is the hardest number in the report to read [2]. The Conference Board review, written with ESGAUGE, Russell Reynolds Associates and Rutgers Law School's governance centre, does not attribute the drop to a single cause [3]. Two candidates point in opposite directions: companies conceding or including proposals they would once have fought, or companies facing fewer proposals worth the paperwork in a season when filings kept falling overall [9]. Only one of those is a governance win.

The chair's July defence rests on ratios [6]. Six suits at under 4% of proposals covered by exclusion notices implies a denominator above 150 [7][20], and the chair added that adverse proxy adviser recommendations were virtually nonexistent [8]. A market-wide rate is the right unit for a regulator assessing a policy and the wrong one for a company that meets the question once and cannot spread it across 150 proposals. Concentration sharpens that further: the report puts 70% of filings with a single proponent [11], so much of the exposure tracks one counterparty's appetite for litigation.

The vote data explains why few boards will want to test any of it. Human capital management proposals fell nearly 60% from 2024 and averaged 6% support [12]. Anti-ESG filings held roughly steady and roughly doubled their support to 5%, but strip out the National Legal and Policy Center's CEO/chair separation items and the average sits just under 2% [13]. Governance support lost five points year on year, a 13% relative decline [22]. Proposals defeated by those margins are cheap to lose on the ballot and expensive to keep off it.

The directors carrying that calculus are already the least popular on the card. Average director support reached 95% across the Russell 3000 and the number of directors below 70% fell 24% over two years [16], while nominating and governance committee chairs remained the lowest-supported committee chairs [17]. Say-on-pay went the same quiet way, with 76% of proposals clearing 90% approval against 72% in 2024 and 2025, though nearly a fifth stayed in the 70 to 90% watch band [14][15].

The activism figures close the loop. Campaigns fell nearly 75% from the 2024 peak [18] while the share aimed at proxy fights went from 7% to 38% [19]. Run the arithmetic and the absolute number of campaigns headed for a fight is roughly 1.4 times the 2024 level [21]. Fewer approaches arrive, and the ones that do arrive already dressed for a vote.

What to watch

  • Whether any of the six proponent lawsuits produces a ruling on what a 'reasonable basis' for exclusion actually requires.
  • Whether exclusion request volume rebounds in 2027 once companies see how the first suits resolve.
  • Whether the proponent behind 70% of filings keeps filing at that rate, and whether it starts litigating exclusions itself.

Clarity's read

What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.

Reality

Evidence58
Adoption74
Hype gap+12
Incentives55
Confidence57
Why these scores

Claim ledger

Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.

  1. [1]

    In withdrawing from substantive review under Rule 14a-8, the SEC staff departed significantly from its traditional gatekeeping role; exclusion decisions that previously relied on SEC staff concurrence now expose companies to the risk of litigation by proponents, which has emerged as a feature of the proxy process.

  2. [2]

    Exclusion request volume fell nearly 50% in the Russell 3000.

  3. [3]

    The 2026 proxy season review was published on corpgov.law.harvard.edu, based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with ESGAUGE, Russell Reynolds Associates and Rutgers Law School's Center for Corporate Law and Governance, authored by Ariane Marchis-Mouren and Keil Lapore. It reviews shareholder voting trends from the first half of the year.

    ReportedSupportedSource: The Conference Board / Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate GovernanceView cited source

Sources

1 independent publisher whose own reporting we read for this story.

  1. corpgov.law.harvard.edu

    1 article · August 22, 2026

    2026 Proxy Season Review: Structural Change in a Lower-Volume Season

Share your take

Let Clarity write the post for you.

Signed-in readers get a short post drafted on this story in the register they choose — narrative, analytical, or a direct position — editable to the last word before it goes anywhere. The share buttons at the top of this story work without an account.

Topics and entities

Follow any of these and your For You feed starts watching them — no settings page required.

Topics

Entities

Loading related stories