Iran will widen attacks on energy markets despite its elites' private fears, Foreign Affairs essay argues

A frightened adversary is usually taken to be one that pressure can move, and the essay raises that reading before rejecting it. "If Tehran still fears Washington, perhaps the U.S. government can pressure Iran's leaders into making concessions," it says ^[13]. The next line answers it: "But this misreads the mood in Iran's capital." ^[14]

The rejection rests on what the war did to the people now making decisions. According to the essay, the war killed friends and family members of Iran's elites. They now see February 28, 2026, the way Israelis see the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, as proof that the enemy must be permanently defeated ^[6]. "They never had much faith in American negotiators; now, they have virtually none," the essay says ^[7].

That chain runs through grief and distrust more than through fear. The private nervousness enters as a question of timing, in the elites' worry that the limits now holding Washington back will lift ^[4][5]. I think that worry gives Tehran a reason to press while those limits last. The essay sets out the strategy, escalation and continuous offense that neither stays the course nor compromises, without tying it to the fear in so many words ^[8].

For energy buyers, the useful detail is in the essay's verbs. Iran "will start doing even more to hurt the economies of the United States' regional partners and to decimate global energy markets," it says, and will expand its attacks on US military infrastructure ^[9]. Assassinations get a "could" and ground offensives a "may" ^[18]. Of everything it forecasts, the essay is most certain about the economic and energy damage ^[9].

The horizon matters more than the next headline. The essay expects any settlement to break down, because Tehran believes Washington will regroup and start fighting again ^[10]. For an operator, the trade-off is between paying now to protect against a closure that runs for years and carrying the cost of being caught short if a deal is signed and then fails. A choice made this quarter to treat the strait as a disruption with an end date decides how exposed a business is on the day such a deal collapses.

The evidence has limits. This is one essay, written against what it describes as the view of many analysts that Tehran will stay the course over the coming year ^[15]. The excerpt does not identify which elites spoke privately or how those conversations were held ^[4].