Taiwan prosecutors say false end-user statements sent TI and ADI radar chips to Chinese missile programs

The US Commerce Department does not allow these parts to ship to China, Hong Kong or Macau, and the buyer has to provide an end-user statement before the manufacturer ships ^[4]. According to prosecutors, the statements attached to these orders promised no export or re-export to US-sanctioned parties ^[6]. They also accepted being bound by US export regulations and acknowledged that end-user declarations are required for sales outside Taiwan ^[6].

Every one of those clauses is a promise from the party signing it. As an access control, the statement authenticates the requester by asking the requester. It is only as strong as the seller's check on the named end user. The orders named the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, or other Taiwanese companies, to put the claimed use inside Taiwan ^[2]. On paper, a domestic defense institute is a plausible buyer for these parts. They are high-speed military-industrial components on Taiwan's strategic high-tech commodities list, cited for use in radar receivers, jammers and antenna arrays among other equipment ^[3].

The distributors were duped, prosecutors say ^[7]. The report does not say whether any of them contacted NCSIST to confirm an order. Third-party buying has moved TI parts before: they turned up in Russian weapons in 2024 after third parties bought them for Russia's military ^[18].

The end-user statement was one of two checks the scheme had to pass. The second was the country-of-origin declaration at customs, and prosecutors say the parts went through no processing in Taiwan that would have changed their origin ^[8]. Hong Kong companies, and companies effectively controlled from mainland China, were among the buyers ^[9].

The charges come from Taiwanese law, not from US export rules. Tom's Hardware notes that breaking US export control law is not a crime in Taiwan, so the case likely runs on fraud and forgery ^[14]. Taiwan's Foreign Trade Act does carry prison terms for exporting listed high-tech goods to controlled areas without a permit ^[15]. Advocates of amending the act want China added as a controlled region, saying current rules fall short of Taiwan's trade cooperation agreements with the US ^[16]. Until that changes, I'd expect diversion cases in Taiwan to keep being charged as document crimes. Keelung prosecutors took that route with Supermicro servers: eight of the nine people indicted in August were charged with breach of trust and document forgery ^[17].

Prosecutors put the takings of the three main defendant groups at more than NT$92.75 million, NT$135.83 million and NT$108.11 million respectively. Four other defendants made between several hundred thousand and NT$6.41 million ^[10]. The three main groups alone come to more than NT$336.69 million ^[20]. Prosecutors argue for heavy sentences on the ground that military components seriously harm Taiwan's national security and could instill distrust of Taiwan in the US ^[12].