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Gentlemen RaaS affiliate ran his own leak site to pocket the ransoms, CloudSEK says
Azazel, a Russian-speaking affiliate of The Gentlemen RaaS crew, ran his own leak site to extort over two dozen victims and kept the proceeds, CloudSEK found. His way in was secrets left in old GitLab commits.
The Watch · Security desk
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What happened
- CloudSEK found two exposed servers holding several terabytes stolen from logistics, insurance, pharmaceutical, AI, medical device and government victims across six countries.
- Inside that network he connected an AI coding assistant to a reverse-shell handler over MCP, using the assistant to issue commands to a compromised machine.
- He kept stolen data on a 29TB staging server linked to a 22TB vault, instead of the temporary cloud storage or rented VPS nodes most Gentlemen affiliates use.
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Why it matters
- exposure Paying The Gentlemen operator settles with the operator. Azazel collected and leaked outside the program, so a single ransom does not retire the stolen data.
- decision The GitLab entry rewards rotating secrets, not deleting them. Pulling a CI/CD token from the current repo leaves it live in commit history, which is where Azazel found it.
- precedent An affiliate running his own leak site behind the operator breaks the premise of ransomware negotiation and points to more fragmented extortion, where no single payee controls the data.
Beyond extorting victims, Azazel cut out the operator whose malware he used, publishing stolen data and collecting the money on Leakned, a leak site he built and ran himself [7][1]. "Azazel was not running a standard affiliate playbook," CloudSEK said in The Gentlemen Files, published October 5 [8][5].
The first chain was credential theft. Azazel harvested secrets from exposed GitLab infrastructure: CI/CD tokens, database credentials, API keys and SSH private keys, which opened cloud systems and databases [9]. CloudSEK assessed that developers had deleted those secrets from current repositories but left them in earlier commits, where Azazel went looking [10].
The second chain was hands-on. Against a medical-imaging company, Azazel exploited a server-side request forgery flaw in an unauthenticated AI medical-imaging API, mapped internal services, then hunted credentials to internal data stores [3]. CloudSEK described it as a "sustained, multi-stage compromise that ran for weeks" [4]. During it he wired an AI coding assistant to a reverse-shell handler over MCP and used the assistant to push commands to a machine inside the victim network [11]. "The Chain B engagement ... reflects a skill level well above standard affiliate tradecraft," the report said [6].
CloudSEK flagged the AI tooling as more than a single trick: "The MCP tooling adds a further dimension: operational use against one victim cluster, global scanning infrastructure for exposed AI assistant ports, and confirmed use of AI tooling for the operator's own infrastructure management" [12]. He also stored data differently from his peers. Azazel kept a 29TB staging server connected to a separate 22TB vault, 51TB in all, instead of the temporary cloud storage or rented VPS nodes most Gentlemen affiliates use [13][14].
What to watch
- Whether law enforcement or CloudSEK moves on Azazel's two exposed servers before they go dark.
- Whether other RaaS affiliates copy the MCP-driven AI assistant tradecraft against live victims.
- Whether The Gentlemen operator retaliates against affiliates found running side leak sites.