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A cracked spreadsheet, a dead man's passwords, and the control nobody documents

Pen Test Partners recovered a family's locked encrypted Excel file in under a minute once relatives recalled the password format. The hygiene was right; the handover did not exist.

The Watch · Security desk

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What happened

  • A man who kept strong, unique passwords in an encrypted Excel file died without sharing the file's password, and his family lost access to everything.
  • Pen Test Partners pulled the hash with office2john, then failed with brute force to nine characters, dictionaries with rules, and family word guesses over a weekend.
  • Relatives then recalled his house style for passwords: a word, a number, an exclamation mark, another word.
  • With that format, a custom combinator attack recovered the 13-character password and the family got back into their accounts and home systems.

Why it matters

  • constraint Correct credential hygiene with no named successor leaves offline cracking as the recovery route, a capability almost no family and few small IT teams can summon on demand.
  • cost The bill for a missing handover document, by the firm's own accounting, was a top-end cracking server plus more electricity than a house burns in a week.
  • exposure A personal or corporate password format is a shared secret across every hash you have ever leaked, so whoever learns the pattern inherits the rest of the estate.
  • decision Password policy has to be split by attack surface rather than set once, because memorable-format rules that survive lockout-protected logins do not survive an offline hash.

The keyspace is where this story actually turns. A 13-character password drawn from the full printable set runs to about 5.1e25 candidates; against the rig Pen Test Partners describes, which it says sustains more than 10 billion hashes per second [7], that is on the order of 160 million years [16]. Once the family remembered that he wrote passwords as word, digit, exclamation, word [5], the same secret became a combinator run: roughly 80,000 dictionary entries decorated with a digit and an optional bang, combined against an 88,000-word list [6]. Assume one digit and the optional character, and that is about 1.4e11 candidates, near fourteen seconds of GPU time [15]. The firm reports it fell in under a minute [7].

Nothing before that recollection could have worked. The team brute-forced to nine characters and ran dictionaries with rules and family-suggested words over a weekend [4], while the answer sat four characters past the ceiling they were sweeping [14]. The password itself was not weak by construction, 13 characters with mixed character classes, and the firm's stated flaw was the two dictionary words inside it [8].

So the man did the thing every security programme asks for. Strong, unique credentials everywhere, stored encrypted [2]. The part that failed was ownership of recovery, and his family were locked out of everything [1]. The blog's author treats that as an engineering problem rather than a paperwork one, and his own arrangement is worth reading as a control specification: a named colleague, Scott, has agreed in advance to simplify the network and strip out Home Assistant, and keeps whatever he removes, with the author's passwords written down, secured and accessible to others [12]. That is a succession plan with a degradation path attached, which matters when Home Assistant is the thing controlling physical access across a 10-VLAN Ubiquiti stack, two internet connections and a Proxmox cluster [11]. A locked-out household there is a door problem, not an inconvenience.

The inversion is the uncomfortable part. The format knowledge that rescued this family is the same asset an attacker wants, and the firm's own guidance says so: memorable-format schemes are acceptable for online accounts sitting behind a lockout policy, and not for anything attackable offline or exposed in a compromised database, where length and the absence of dictionary words are what count [9]. A house style for passwords is a shared secret across every hash you have ever leaked.

This is one vendor's account of one job, and the throughput figure is self-reported [7]. Take the list it ends on as the audit scope, though, because it is more concrete than most break-glass documentation: device and laptop access, BitLocker, the password manager's own master credential, then domain registrar, finance, insurance and house control [10]. Every one of those is a single-custodian dependency until someone writes down who inherits it.

What to watch

  • Whether password managers ship real inheritance and emergency-access workflows that auditors can inspect, rather than optional trusted-contact features buried in settings.
  • Whether break-glass credential recovery starts appearing as a named, tested control in security frameworks and insurance questionnaires alongside backup restore tests.
  • Whether smart-home platforms that gate physical access grow a documented degradation mode for when the administrator is gone.

Clarity's read

What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.

Reality

Evidence46
Adoption19
Hype gap+12
Incentives62
Confidence54
Why these scores

Claim ledger

Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.

  1. [1]

    A colleague of the author learned that the father of a friend had died; the man had stored his passwords in an encrypted Excel spreadsheet and none of his family knew the password, leaving them locked out of everything.

    ReportedSupportedSource: Pen Test Partners security blogView cited source
  2. [2]

    The deceased was described as tech-savvy, had invested in smart home technology, and used strong and unique passwords everywhere, stored in an encrypted Excel file.

    ReportedSupportedView cited source
  3. [3]

    The author used the office2john Python script to extract the hash from the Excel file and ran Hashcat on the firm's most powerful password cracking server.

    ReportedSupportedView cited source

Sources

1 independent publisher whose own reporting we read for this story.

  1. pentestpartners.com

    1 article · August 26, 2026

    Estate planning of credentials

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  • Encrypted file and vault recoveryFollow
  • Smart home and home lab operational riskFollow
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