DataDome's Segura calls its 8.9% Muse endpoint figure a measure of exposure
DataDome says 8.9% of requests in its Meta Muse sample reached form, login, payment, account-creation or cart endpoints. Researcher Jérôme Segura told Let's Data Science it counts exposure, so blocking rules built on request counts alone act on incomplete evidence.
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DataDome's agentic-browser category went from about 12.5 million requests in August to 58.2 million in September, which the report gives as a rounded 4.7-fold increase.
| Measure | Value | As of | Claim |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agentic-browser category, about | 12.5 million requests | August | 5 |
| Agentic-browser category | 58.2 million requests | September | 5 |
What happened
- In the third quarter of 2026, DataDome's network logged close to 25 billion requests from AI agents, a 41.5% rise over the quarter before.
- Requests in its agentic-browser category climbed from roughly 12.5 million in August to 58.2 million in September.
- In the Muse sample, 99.3% of requests came from cloud or CDN infrastructure.
- The report separately counts 29.1 million Muse requests from September 22 through October 3.
Why it matters
- decision Before blocking, an operator has to write down what acceptable agent behavior means on its own site, because DataDome's figure supplies no such definition.
- constraint The 8.9% and 99.3% describe the Muse sample only, so multiplying them by the 29.1 million total would produce counts nobody measured.
- contradiction Segura put collection at September 21 through month end, while the 29.1 million total covers September 22 to October 3, so the sample window is unsettled.
A request log records that a URL was fetched. According to Let's Data Science (LDS), a request by itself can't show a retailer whether the agent loaded a page, tried a transaction, finished a purchase or caused harm [9]. DataDome's VP of Threat Research, Jérôme Segura, gave written answers to LDS on exactly this point [13]. "On its own, a request to a sensitive endpoint shows that an agent reached it, not what it did. Our 8.9% figure measures that exposure, not confirmed abuse," Segura said [1].
The 8.9% bucket is defined by where a request landed: forms, login, payment, account-creation or cart [2]. Abuse needs more. As LDS summarizes his answer, evidence of abuse takes additional signals, such as repeated submissions or high failure rates, set against the business's own definition of acceptable behavior [8]. In our view, a rule that fires on "agent plus checkout URL" acts on exposure alone. LDS adds that the endpoint mix does not show whether a session was authenticated, and that it could not use the percentages to estimate how many agents submitted forms, bought products or attempted fraud [10].
The growth figures have the same transfer problem. The report's rounded 4.7-fold rise holds up: 58.2 divided by 12.5 is 4.66 [14]. But these are request counts, not counts of people, successful tasks or purchases [12]. Segura said the customer base stayed generally unchanged, with most industries represented and some more heavily than others [6]. LDS notes that DataDome has published no comparison of the same sites measured by the same detection method, and that an individual business cannot assume its own traffic grew at the same rate [7].
For DataDome's quarterly rise to describe your traffic, your industry mix would have to resemble DataDome's customer mix. The detector would also have to have behaved the same way in both quarters. Neither condition is documented.
Attribution is the other open input. DataDome identifies Muse by fingerprinting, on the client side, artifacts tied to the cloud browser it uses; it does not go by the network addresses those requests share [19]. Its answers gave no error rate for that attribution and no independent data set to check it against [20]. DataDome also corrected its release to describe nine days of September availability, not eight [18]. The sample denominator and selection method were not supplied in the answers [17].
What to watch
- DataDome publishing the sample denominator and selection method behind the 8.9% and 99.3% figures.
- A traced example showing a Muse request through to a completed action, with session authentication status.
- An attribution error rate or independent validation set for the Muse client-side fingerprint.
Clarity's read
What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.
Reality
- Evidence40
- Adoption50
- Hype gap−10
- Incentives
- Insufficient
- Confidence60
Claim ledger
Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
- [1]
"On its own, a request to a sensitive endpoint shows that an agent reached it, not what it did. Our 8.9% figure measures that exposure, not confirmed abuse."
- [2]
DataDome's report says 8.9% of requests in its sample of traffic attributed to Meta's Muse reached forms, login, payment, account-creation or cart endpoints.
- [3]
The report says 99.3% of requests in the Muse sample came from cloud or CDN infrastructure.
- [4]
DataDome reports nearly 25 billion AI-agent requests across its network in the third quarter of 2026, up 41.5% from the previous quarter.
- [5]
DataDome's agentic-browser category rose from about 12.5 million requests in August to 58.2 million in September, a rounded 4.7-fold increase.
- [6]
Segura said the customer base remained generally unchanged, with most industries represented but some more heavily represented than others.
- [7]
LDS says Segura's answer is not a published comparison of an identical set of sites under an unchanged detection method, and an individual business cannot assume its own traffic grew at the same rate.
- [8]
Per Segura's answer as summarized by LDS, evidence of abuse requires additional signals, such as repeated submissions or high failure rates, together with the business's definition of acceptable behavior; reaching a checkout-related URL is not enough.
- [9]
A request to a payment endpoint alone does not tell a retailer whether the agent loaded a page, attempted a transaction, completed a purchase or did something harmful.
- [10]
The supplied material does not include a traced example through to a completed action, so LDS cannot use the endpoint percentages to estimate how many agents submitted forms, bought products or attempted fraud; the endpoint mix also does not establish whether a session was authenticated.
- [11]
LDS says the two percentages should be treated as findings about the reported sample and should not be multiplied by the broader total to manufacture counts the researchers have not provided.
- [12]
The request totals are counts of requests, not counts of people, successful tasks or purchases.
- [13]
Jérôme Segura is VP of Threat Research at DataDome and gave written answers to Let's Data Science.
- [14]
58.2 million divided by 12.5 million is about 4.66, which rounds to the report's 4.7-fold.
- [15]
The report separately counts 29.1 million Muse requests from September 22 through October 3.
- [16]
In his reply, Segura described Muse collection beginning September 21 and continuing through the end of the month, which differs from the September 22 to October 3 window attached to the 29.1 million total.
- [17]
The exact sample denominator and selection method were not supplied in the answers.
- [18]
DataDome corrected its accompanying release to describe nine days of September availability, rather than eight.
- [19]
Segura said DataDome identifies Muse through client-side fingerprinting of artifacts associated with the cloud browser it uses, rather than relying on shared network addresses.
- [20]
The reply did not provide an attribution error rate or an independent validation set.
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Sources
1 independent publisher whose own reporting we read for this story.
- letsdatascience.comDataDome tells LDS why an AI agent at checkout is not proof of abuse
1 article · October 15, 2026
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