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Security1 publisher3 min readPublished

Ten simulated bots walked past 65.3% of the popular sites DataDome tested

DataDome measured malicious bot activity up 124% in the year to June 2026 against 13.2% growth for humans, and its own detection test found most popular sites challenged none of ten simulated bots.

The Watch · Security desk

Illustration accompanying Ten simulated bots walked past 65.3% of the popular sites DataDome tested

What happened

  • DataDome puts malicious bot activity up 124% between July 2025 and June 2026, measured across trillions of requests to more than 75,000 customer sites, against 13.2% growth in human traffic.
  • Bots and AI agents generated about 26.5% of all traffic in that dataset, with traffic from AI agents and large language model crawlers up 82.3% over the same 12 months.
  • In a separate test against popular websites, 65.3% failed to detect any of 10 simulated bots and 2.4% stopped or challenged every type.
  • Monthly AI bot traffic to login pages rose more than eightfold in the first half of 2026, driven by assistants checking orders, retrieving account information and supporting purchases.

Compiled by The WatchSomething wrong?How this is made

Why it matters

  • exposure Login pages now receive authorized assistants and credential testers in the same request stream, so a site that decides on the first request will refuse customers along with attackers.
  • constraint API, mobile and server-side endpoints never run client-side code, so coverage there means inspecting sequence and volume in the request path. That is a different build from adding a JavaScript challenge.
  • cost More than a quarter of requests being automated puts bot load inside bandwidth, origin capacity and rate-limit budgets whether or not anyone is accounting for it separately.

The test set covered simple scripts, bots presenting themselves as recognized AI services, tools with forged browser fingerprints, and automated instances of real browsers, and the requests were sent through residential internet addresses in the United States, Canada and France [22]. Subtracting the sites that challenged everything and the sites that challenged nothing leaves 32.3% with partial coverage [3].

On growth, 124% against 13.2% is roughly 9.4 times the human rate [1]. The 82.3% rise in AI agent and crawler traffic is about 6.2 times it [2]. Human traffic's share of requests fell over the period, and bad bots accounted for most of that change [7].

Scraping was the dominant activity, at 70.9% of bad bot traffic [10]. In a 30-day sample, simple bots were the largest single share, cheap to run and still effective against sites with limited protection, used for scanning, reconnaissance and attacks on easier targets [12]. Average-complexity bots built on browser automation frameworks turn up in scraping, fake-account creation and credential testing [13]. Advanced operators keep their better tooling separate from the basic bots so that a simple automation signal does not expose a campaign [14]. Credential stuffing was flat year on year, with attackers running high-volume attacks, withdrawing to refresh credential lists and rotate infrastructure, then returning at full scale [9][11].

Browser-side signals do not cover this. They can be suppressed or imitated, and requests aimed at APIs, mobile endpoints or server-side services may never execute client-side code at all [15]. User-agent allowlists fail the other way: malicious software can copy the string of a recognized AI service and arrive as a trusted crawler, while an unfamiliar bot misses the rules written for known services [20]. That pushes detection onto the sequence, speed, volume and context of each interaction, because one request may not reveal a visitor's purpose [19].

"Organizations are being asked to make more nuanced decisions with defenses that are still largely built around binary choices," said Jerome Segura, VP of Threat Research at DataDome [17]. "The ability to distinguish a legitimate AI assistant from a credential-testing bot or an automated account-abuse campaign will be critical to protecting customers without blocking beneficial activity," he said [18].

The two halves of the report measure different populations. Traffic share and growth come from trillions of requests to DataDome's own customer sites [5]. The failure rate comes from tests against popular websites, and the report does not state how many sites were in that set [25]. Volume gave little indication of protection: high-traffic sites performed at a similar level to sites with smaller audiences [23]. DataDome attributes the gaps at large organizations to complex infrastructure, disconnected tools and legacy systems [24].

What to watch

  • Whether credential stuffing breaks out of its flat annual line in the second half of 2026 after the surge-and-withdraw cycle DataDome describes.
  • An independent, non-vendor measurement of automated traffic share that tests the 26.5% figure.
  • Whether sites publish agent policies that separate an authorized assistant at a login page from a credential-testing bot instead of blocking both.
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