Science1 publisherNot yet confirmed elsewhere2 min readPublished
The GSK-Pfizer merger did cut costs. A rival put prices up 8.55 percent anyway.
A study of Philippine cough and cold prices confirms real savings on Pfizer lines after the 2019 deal, then finds Sanofi, never a party to it, raised prices by more than Pfizer's fell.
The Scientist · Science desk
What happened
- Researchers compared over-the-counter cough and cold prices in the Philippines before and after GSK and Pfizer combined their consumer health businesses in 2019.
- The authors report evidence consistent with greater coordination between GSK/Pfizer and Sanofi after the deal, without any explicit price agreement.
- The merging companies had forecast eventual savings of around 500 million pounds a year.
Compiled by The ScientistSomething wrong?How this is made
Why it matters
- constraint If agencies accept the authors' recommendation, a documented efficiency stops being a self-contained defence and parties have to show the deal does not also make tacit coordination easier.
- cost The largest increase landed on customers of a firm that filed nothing and gave no undertakings, which is the one group a merger remedy cannot reach.
- contradiction The same dataset supports both sides of a merger hearing: real cost savings for the parties, and a rival price rise bigger than the parties' price cut.
- precedent A peer-reviewed coordinated-effects finding on a completed consumer health deal gives authorities a citable basis for treating rival price responses as a reviewable harm rather than speculation.
Start with the pass-through, because it is the one quantity here that can be computed rather than asserted. Pfizer's estimated cost of supply in the category fell 9.43 percent, and the prices of those same products fell 6.57 percent [3][4]. The ratio of the two is about 0.70, so roughly 70 percent of the measured saving reached the till and about 30 percent stayed inside the firm [14].
The awkward part is that the products getting cheaper and the products getting dearer sat inside the same combined business. GSK's prices rose an estimated 3.25 percent [6] while its new stablemate's fell [4]. Sanofi, which was not a party to the transaction, went up 8.55 percent [5], about 2.6 times GSK's move [16] and roughly two percentage points larger in magnitude than Pfizer's decline [15]. Of the four suppliers the study names, exactly one lowered prices [17]. Unilab, the cheaper local manufacturer, stayed broadly where it was [7].
That pattern is where the coordination finding comes from. The authors report evidence consistent with greater coordination between GSK/Pfizer and Sanofi after the deal, and Bokhari is explicit that this does not mean the firms agreed on prices: with fewer independent competitors, coordinating gets easier without any agreement, and prices settle above what competition would produce [9]. The finding names the branded suppliers and not Unilab [9][7], which is the shape you would expect if the cheap local line was never in the same pricing game to begin with.
Two notes on evidentiary weight. Ennis points out that confirming efficiencies for one of the merging firms is not widely studied [11], and that cuts both ways: the paper strengthens the case that efficiency claims can be literally true, then shows that being true is not the same as being sufficient. And the Philippine Competition Commission is one of the co-author institutions [13], so the recommendation to weigh coordination alongside efficiency [10] is not arriving from outside the agency world.
The £500 million a year the companies forecast [8] is a deal-level figure, while what the study measures is one product category in one country [2]. Nothing here tests that forecast. What it tests is whether a saving of that kind reaches shoppers, and even then the reported numbers are firm-level percentage changes with no volume weights attached, so the net effect on the average Philippine cough-and-cold buyer cannot be recovered from them [18]. The narrower claim is the one that is hard to argue with: the efficiency was real, and the unmerged rival's prices rose by more than the merged one's fell.
What to watch
- Whether any competition authority begins asking merging parties for evidence on how non-party rivals are likely to price after a deal, not just on their own claimed savings.