Product4 publishers3 min readPublished
Flock built the thing it said it could not do, then left the prompts on a public server
WIRED says it pulled 69 prewritten police prompts and 45 tool definitions off Flock's own website. The procurement lesson: a vendor's "cannot" describes this build, not the next one.
The Product Desk · Product desk
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What happened
- Flock Safety has told the public for years that its technology "cannot recognize, identify, or track individuals."
- Flock has built an artificial intelligence tool for police that can identify drivers and track vehicles by their patterns of movement alone, WIRED reported.
- Flock operates a network of cameras that logs the movements of drivers in more than 6,000 communities.
- The tool can search for people in an area drawn on a map based on nothing more than a physical description.
- The software, originally called Nightshift and more recently renamed OS Investigate, ships with 69 prewritten prompts that officers can select, review, or edit and then submit to the AI; officers can also input prompts of their own.
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Why it matters
Flock Safety, whose cameras log driver movements in more than 6,000 communities, has told the public for years that its technology "cannot recognize, identify, or track individuals" [1][3]. WIRED reports the company has now built an AI tool for police that does both, identifying drivers and tracking vehicles by their movement patterns alone [2].
The evidence is unusually concrete. According to WIRED, the prompts and code sat in a cache of more than 450 files on Flock's own website, served by its login pages to anyone who loaded them [8]. The software, originally called Nightshift and more recently OS Investigate, ships with 69 prewritten prompts an officer can select, review or edit, and submit; officers can also write their own [7]. The code describes 45 tools available to the model, with access to plate scans and camera metadata, arrest records, case files, dispatch logs, ballistics results, and commercial databases holding Social Security numbers, dates of birth, phone numbers, email addresses, relatives and associates [9].
That inventory is the whole argument. Flock's original transaction was narrow: photograph a plate, convert it to text, check it against a list of vehicles police want, ignore the rest [13]. WIRED describes the preloaded prompts as an inversion of that deal, in which the officer supplies a place, a window of time and a behavior, and the system returns the people who fit, with no plate, name or crime to start from [14]. One prompt asks for witnesses based on the vehicles most often seen in a neighborhood over the last 14 days during a daily time window, excluding whitelisted vehicles; the output is a list of plates that other tools convert into names and home addresses [15]. Another lists everyone arrested more than twice in two years for any offense except narcotics, maps where those people live, pulls the calls for service at their homes, and instructs the system to "do a workup on the top 3 individuals" [16]. A workup is a one-command background check that starts from a name and date of birth and returns vehicles, prior suspect listings, then relatives, phone numbers and online accounts [17]. Nineteen of the prompts hunt for patterns rather than look up a record, and fourteen require no plate, name or description at all [18], roughly a fifth of the menu [20]. The system can also search for people inside an area drawn on a map using nothing but a physical description [6].
Flock says the product is in testing with a small group of law enforcement partners, is still in development, and may not ship with these capabilities [10]. Take that at face value and the procurement problem gets worse, not better. "Cannot identify individuals" was a true description of a hotlist match and a worthless constraint on a roadmap. A negative capability claim from a vendor has a shelf life equal to the next release; the sentence stayed the same while the product moved. Any policy, contract or council authorization that leans on it is authorizing whatever the vendor builds next. Privacy and legal experts already argue Flock's existing tools raise constitutional problems by giving police broad, often warrantless access to a vast movement record [12].
Watch whether Flock's public "cannot" language survives, and which of the 69 prompts appear in the shipping build [7][10]. Watch whether agencies rewrite policy around enumerated capabilities and audit logs rather than vendor assurances, as bipartisan pressure, documented officer misuse and camera vandalism accumulate [11]. And watch the file exposure itself: a company serving 450 internal files off its login pages is a separate control failure from the one being debated [8].