Product1 distinct publisher3 min readUpdated
Latham & Watkins asked, and the SEC's structured finance staff agreed. The answer landed a fortnight before Nvidia's $500bn financing announcement, and it carries no legal force.
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Latham & Watkins wrote to the Securities and Exchange Commission on 23 July with a narrow question: do data centre securitisations fall outside the Exchange Act definition of an asset-backed security [1]. Kayla Roberts, who chairs the SEC's Office of Structured Finance, replied on 29 July that the staff agreed, an exchange that took six days [2][3]. That definition matters because it carries the risk retention rules written into Dodd-Frank after the 2008 crisis, which require a deal sponsor to keep some risk on its own books [4]. A fortnight later Nvidia announced $500bn of AI infrastructure financing alongside Apollo, BlackRock, Blackstone, Brookfield, Goldman Sachs and KKR [5][6]. The argument turns on one phrase. An asset-backed security rests on a self-liquidating financial asset, which the SEC has read since 1992 as one converting into cash within a finite period [7]. A mortgage qualifies, because repayment extinguishes it [8]. Latham argued a data centre does not: the facilities are tangible and physical, they endure beyond the life of the securities, they may appreciate, and when the notes are repaid the issuer still owns the building [9]. Set against a single-asset commercial mortgage deal, where the issuer holds only the loan and ends up with nothing, the comparison held, and the staff accepted it [10]. Read the asset list and the reasoning is hard to argue with. The letter describes buildings and data halls, electrical and backup power, cooling, network connectivity, physical security, land, and the contracts needed to run the sites [11]. It does not mention chips or graphics processors [12]. The economics are where consequence sits. Loan-to-value tops out at 70% of appraised value, notes carry an anticipated repayment date of around five years, and final maturity runs 25 to 30 years [13]. That 70% cap leaves at least 30% of appraised value to be funded from somewhere else [2], and Orion Mountainspring, a securitisation lawyer at Orrick, told CNBC the response gives sponsors the chance to push that equity down over time, calling it good news for them [20]. B.K. Lee at Alston & Bird expects more flexible, more capital-efficient structures and more deals now the guidance exists in writing [21]. Nearly all these deals use a master trust, which lets sponsors issue further securities later, add data centres, and in some cases dispose of or substitute assets [14]. Investors generally have no recourse to the sponsor or operator, with the usual exceptions for fraud, wilful misconduct and gross negligence [15]. Scale matters to how much this moves. Latham told the SEC the market has passed $50bn in cumulative debt issuance since the first deal in 2018 [16]; Nvidia's announced number is about ten times that entire history [1]. Participants had complied with the asset-backed rules throughout, the letter says, "out of an abundance of caution" rather than because the definition required it [17]. Three cautions belong in the same breath. The response reflects the views of the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance, not the Commission, which has "neither approved nor disapproved its content"; it is not a rule and has "no legal force or effect" [18]. The staff add that their views rest on Latham's representations, and that different facts or conditions might produce a different conclusion [19]. And Seth Messner of Katten Muchin Rosenman, who told CNBC's Tobias Burns that Latham asked the SEC to put these deals outside risk retention and the SEC basically agreed, was more cautious on Nvidia: it is not clear whether its agreements are designed for securitisation, only that the guidance sounds applicable if they are [22][23]. Watch whether Nvidia's memoranda of understanding turn into securitisable contracts, since the company has not said whether the platforms will securitise anything [26]. Watch the equity in the next deal priced after 29 July, and watch whether the Commission itself ever ratifies what its staff wrote.
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Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
Latham & Watkins wrote to the SEC on 23 July asking a narrow question: do data centre securitisations fall outside the Exchange Act definition of an asset-backed security?
Kayla Roberts, who chairs the SEC's Office of Structured Finance, replied on 29 July that the staff agreed with Latham's view.
The exchange between Latham & Watkins and the SEC staff took six days.
The Exchange Act asset-backed security definition carries the risk retention rules written into Dodd-Frank after the 2008 crisis, which require a deal sponsor to keep some risk on its own books.
Seth Messner of Katten Muchin Rosenman told Tobias Burns at CNBC that Latham asked the SEC to put these deals outside the risk retention rules and the SEC basically agreed.
Messner said it is not clear whether Nvidia's agreements are designed for securitisation, only that the guidance sounds applicable if they are.
Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Document-anchored but single-outlet and unlinked
The account is built on a datable primary exchange - a 23 July request, a 29 July staff reply from a named SEC official - and quotes the staff response's own limiting language directly, plus four named practitioners at Orrick, Alston & Bird and Katten. That is unusually concrete for a regulatory story. It is nonetheless one publisher relaying documents and CNBC-sourced quotes without independent verification, and the SEC and ratings agencies declined to comment, so the interpretive half of the story rests entirely on sponsor-side counsel.
Established market, unproven post-letter behaviour
There is real, disclosed adoption of the underlying instrument: $50bn of cumulative data centre securitisation issuance since 2018, master trusts in nearly all deals, and standardised terms. What is not yet observable is adoption of the new perimeter - no deal priced, structure filed or equity reduction is documented since the staff response, and the $500bn Nvidia platforms are memoranda of understanding with no stated securitisation component.
Framing outruns the instrument's force
The substance is real and understated in places - the collateral boundary excluding chips, and the derived point that a 70% LTV cap still leaves at least 30% to fund elsewhere, are genuinely useful. But the causal chain implied by pairing a staff no-objection with a $500bn announcement overstates what happened: the response binds nobody, rests on Latham's representations, and Nvidia has not said any of the $500bn involves securitisation. The publisher partly self-corrects by quoting the disclaimers and listing what would settle it, which keeps the gap moderate rather than large.
Interpretation supplied by sponsor-side counsel
Incentives are visible on the record rather than inferred. Latham has worked the market since the 2018 first deal and sought a reading that relieves its clients of risk retention, having characterised prior compliance as precautionary. Every interpreting voice - Orrick, Alston & Bird, Katten - is transaction counsel whose practice benefits from more, larger and more capital-efficient deals, and one explicitly calls the outcome good news for sponsors. The parties without that interest, the SEC and the ratings agencies, declined to speak.
Facts solid, consequences open
Confidence in the documentary core is high: dates, the named official, the quoted disclaimers and the described deal terms are specific and internally consistent. Confidence in the story's implications is much lower, because the instrument is non-binding and fact-contingent, the Nvidia linkage is unconfirmed, ratings treatment of compute-linked collateral is unaddressed, and there is only one publisher in the cluster.
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1 article · August 17, 2026