Security1 distinct publisher3 min readUpdated
A Material Security executive argues the Vercel and Composio breaches were one attack run twice, entered through a token rather than an inbox. The same pattern describes sanctioned AI agents.
The Watch · Security desk

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Rajan Kapoor, VP Security at Material Security, has published an argument in BleepingComputer that the Vercel and Composio breaches were not two separate incidents but the same attack run twice against different targets, with email absent from the entry point [1][2][3]. If that reading is right, the control set most teams built for Google Workspace is guarding a door the attacker no longer uses.
The familiar chain is well worn: a malicious email lands, a credential is stolen, an account takeover follows, the attacker reads Gmail and Drive, pivots through password resets and magic links, and sits undetected for days, weeks or months [6]. That model was built for a period when attackers were mainly after credentials via phishing, and Kapoor's contention is that it no longer holds because attackers chain through the workspace rather than merely getting in through an inbox [5]. The unstated assumption underneath it was that email is the dangerous channel and the rest of Workspace is comparatively safe [4].
In the sequence Kapoor describes, the building blocks are the same but the order is inverted. Persistence comes first, through a stolen OAuth token [7]. The token is then used to reach data in Gmail and Drive [10]. The account takeover is executed via OAuth rather than email, and it is the resulting email access that turns a single compromised account into a broader incident [11]. Only then come the lateral pivots, using credentials found in Drive together with password resets and magic links sent to the inbox [12]. Put plainly, what was step one in the old model has become step three [18].
The properties of the token are the reason this matters operationally. According to Kapoor, OAuth tokens survive password resets, do not expire, are invisible to users and largely invisible to security teams that are not monitoring app behaviour [8]. He also frames the stolen token as a supply chain problem: a supplier is compromised, and the outcome is access into your environment [9]. A forced password reset and an MFA re-enrolment, the standard account takeover playbook, do not touch any of that.
Then the uncomfortable part. The pattern Kapoor sets out, an OAuth grant used to read email and Drive and then to move past the workspace, is also a description of how AI agents behave by design, every day, as employees connect them to Google Workspace [13][14]. Detection that keys on the shape of the behaviour will fire on the sanctioned integrations too.
Two caveats on provenance. This is a vendor byline: Kapoor's employer sells a product that connects email, OAuth and Drive security, and the article carries a request-a-demo call to action [1][16]. And the evidence is his own, drawn from Vercel, Composio and a growing number of incidents his company says it is tracking [15]. The piece supplies no dates, no token scopes, no victim counts and no attribution for either named breach, so the pattern claim cannot be checked against the underlying incidents from this material alone [17].
What to watch: whether your OAuth grant inventory is reviewed on the same cadence as your password policy, whether token revocation is part of offboarding and incident response rather than an afterthought, and whether anything in your tooling can tell an attacker's grant from an agent's grant when both read Gmail and Drive at scale. Kapoor's own expectation is that the building blocks stay constant while attackers, using AI tooling to find and scale, keep recombining them [19].
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Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
In the evolved chain Kapoor describes, the attacks started by establishing persistence through a stolen OAuth token, which becomes the entryway into email rather than the reverse.
In the described sequence, the attacker used the stolen token to get into data stored in Gmail and Drive.
Kapoor states the account takeover was initially executed using OAuth, not email, and that access to email converts a compromised inbox into a much broader incident.
The final step described is lateral movement across connected systems using a combination of credentials stored in Drive and password resets or magic links via email.
The article was written by Rajan Kapoor, VP Security at Material Security, and published by bleepingcomputer.com under the headline 'The Modern Attack Chain: Rethinking Google Workspace Security in the Age of AI'.
Kapoor describes the dominant mental model of the last decade as: email is the dangerous channel, and everything else in Google Workspace is relatively safe.
Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Single vendor-authored source, no primary artifacts
Everything in the cluster comes from one bylined post by a security vendor executive. The structural argument (same chain elements, new order) is fully visible and self-consistent in the text, but the factual base is thin: two breaches are invoked with no dates, token scopes, victim counts or attribution, the recurrence claim relies on undisclosed internal tracking, the token-behaviour generalisations cite no documentation, and the AI-agent scenario is hypothetical. No advisory, log excerpt, vendor postmortem or independent report is present.
No adoption or deployment measurement available
The cluster contains no counts, telemetry, survey data or disclosed deployments. Two breaches are cited without scope or victim numbers, the number of further tracked incidents is unquantified, and the claim that employees are connecting AI agents to Workspace 'faster than security teams can track' carries no measurement. There is also no usage, customer or install figure for the vendor's own product, so no adoption level can be scored.
Strong pattern claims outrun the evidence shown
Positive gap: the rhetoric — two breaches declared 'the same attack, run twice', a growing but unnamed set of tracked incidents, and sanctioned AI agents cast as attackers-by-design — is materially stronger than what the text substantiates. The reordering argument itself is modest and defensible, which keeps the gap from being extreme, but the load-bearing incident claims lack particulars, the token generalisations are absolute ('don't expire'), and the piece resolves into a product demo pitch. Direction is overstatement rather than understatement.
Vendor executive selling the gap he describes
The author is VP Security at Material Security, a company whose product is positioned to connect email, OAuth and Drive security, and the article contains an in-body pitch and a 'Request a Demo' link for Google Workspace. The argument's conclusion — that Workspace controls watching email miss the real front door — is precisely the purchase rationale for the sponsor's product. Provenance is openly disclosed, which is mitigating, but the commercial alignment between the claim and the seller is direct and strong.
Low — one publisher, one interested author, no corroboration
Provenance, authorship and commercial interest are unambiguous, and the article's own claims are quoted with high fidelity, so confidence in what was said is high. Confidence in whether it is true is low: a single source, a single interested author, no independent reporting on the two cited breaches, no telemetry behind the agent claim, and a body text that is truncated in the supplied material. The structural reordering thesis is the part most likely to survive scrutiny; the incident and agent claims cannot be checked from this cluster.
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1 article · August 14, 2026