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A Cloudflare engineer argues web apps should let users generate their own missing features. The hard part is not the code generation, it is running that code beside live customer data.
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Jeremy Morrell, a principal engineer at Cloudflare, published an essay on August 18 proposing that web applications let users generate the features product teams will never get around to building, with a stable accountable core and controlled extension points [1][2]. The consequential claim is not that a model can write the code; it is that the opportunity belongs to platforms able to run that code safely inside products holding real customer data, which promotes sandboxing from an infrastructure detail to a thing the product has to sell [3]. Morrell's diagnosis of the product problem is ordinary, which is its strength. Teams prioritise features serving the largest groups of customers, so requests further down the demand curve wait, stay manual, or never ship [4]. Shipping all of them would leave the interface carrying the accumulated preferences of thousands of unrelated users [5]. His examples stay small: a read-it-later service forwarding every saved article longer than 4,000 words to an e-reader, a research tool that finds new papers in a narrow field weekly and adds summaries, an agent that repairs a parser which keeps mishandling one publication [6]. The essay earns its keep after the model returns code. Morrell's model depends on a runtime that keeps generated code inside a controlled boundary while still letting it perform useful actions, with the host application retaining responsibility for access, reliability and the data an extension can see [7][8]. The open questions he lists are deployment, permissions, resource limits, debugging and tenant isolation [9]. In the passage Simon Willison quoted a day later, Morrell splits the credit evenly: "LLMs radically lower the cost of authoring extensions, and modern sandbox primitives lower the deployment cost and provide good security boundaries" [10][11]. There is a reason to be strict about that boundary. A June 2026 security study found recurring vulnerabilities in applications produced through natural-language coding, including exposed secrets, unfiltered input and placeholder logic, and better models and prompts reduced the problems in the researchers' testing without eliminating the underlying risk [12]. Any host that accepts user-generated extensions is accepting that failure rate as steady-state input. Working prior art exists, but for a narrow audience. Pi, an open-source terminal coding-agent harness published under Earendil Works, is Morrell's clearest example: it exposes hooks for tools, commands, events and its terminal interface, and a user can ask it to write a TypeScript extension, reload it during a session and package the result for others [13][14]. Pi treats features as optional modules rather than permanent additions to the core [15]. OpenCode is moving similarly with an internal plugin architecture [16]. Both currently assume users comfortable running code locally, inspecting permissions and accepting the risks [17]. That assumption is the whole gap. Accountants, doctors, lawyers and support staff have highly specific workflows and cannot reasonably be expected to administer arbitrary local code [18]. Pete Koomen, the Optimizely co-founder now a general partner at Y Combinator, described the adjacent problem as "Small Software"; a July 22 Y Combinator post argued agents had made personal tools easier to create while deployment, security and sharing stayed considerably harder [19][20]. Morrell relocates that argument inside existing products: the SaaS provider supplies the trusted data, interface and runtime, and generated extensions handle the peculiar last mile [21]. His background is platform plumbing rather than model research: roughly five years at Heroku from 2019 to 2024, owning the Node.js language experience and later leading an observability team, then Cloudflare from November 2024 [22][23]. Runtimewire also notes Cloudflare has an infrastructure reason to like the thesis, which is worth holding in mind when reading it [24]. What to watch: the first mainstream SaaS vendor to publish a permission model and an isolation boundary for user-authored extensions, rather than describing one in a blog post [9].
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Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
Jeremy Morrell is a principal engineer at Cloudflare who wants web applications to let users generate the features product teams will never have time to build.
In an essay published August 18, Morrell lays out a model for web software built around a stable, accountable core and controlled extension points, in which a user describes a workflow in plain English, an LLM writes the code, and it runs inside a sandbox managed by the host application.
Morrell wrote: "LLMs radically lower the cost of authoring extensions, and modern sandbox primitives lower the deployment cost and provide good security boundaries. We can build our app as a solid, accountable core, and allow users to safely extend it in many directions by having LLMs fill in the missing pieces."
Runtimewire's account of the essay states under a section heading that Cloudflare has an infrastructure reason to like Morrell's thesis; the supplied text is cut off before the explanation.
LLMs can write niche features on demand, but the larger opportunity belongs to platforms that can run that code safely inside products holding real customer data.
Software teams prioritize features that serve the largest groups of customers; requests farther down the demand curve wait, remain manual, or never ship.
Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Primary essay verified, supporting specifics single-sourced
The central artifact is solid: Morrell's hypothesis is quoted verbatim in one source and reported in detail by the other, so what the essay argues is not in doubt. Everything beyond the essay is thin -- the June 2026 security study is cited without researchers or venue, OpenCode's plugin architecture is a one-line assertion, and Pi, Cloudflare Dynamic Workers and Cloudflare OS are described only through a single trade outlet. No benchmark, audit or independent test of the sandboxed-extension pattern appears anywhere in the cluster.
Developer-tool prototypes only; no production SaaS deployment
Three concrete artifacts exist in the direction of the thesis -- Pi's extension hooks and in-session generated extensions, OpenCode's reported plugin architecture, and Cloudflare OS with sandboxed Gadgets and Gatekeepers guardrails -- but all are developer-facing or internally originated, and the cluster reports no install counts, customers, or any web application that lets ordinary users generate extensions beside live customer data. The reporting itself concedes these projects assume users comfortable running code locally, which is the opposite of the mass audience the thesis targets.
Forward-looking promise runs ahead of demonstrated practice
The framing -- 'give our users super powers', sandbox primitives that 'provide good security boundaries', a new platform opportunity -- is aspirational, while demonstrated practice amounts to a few developer tools plus an internally originated Cloudflare project. The gap is moderate rather than severe because the trade report itself resists the hype: it foregrounds tenant isolation, permissions, resource limits and debugging as the unsolved work, cites vulnerabilities in natural-language-coded applications, and notes every extension point expands the security model and support burden. The quotation post, by contrast, carries the optimistic claim with none of those caveats attached.
Thesis favors the author's employer and a VC's deal thesis
The argument's load-bearing requirement -- cheap, safe, host-managed sandboxes for runtime-supplied code -- maps directly onto products sold and published by Cloudflare, where the author is a principal engineer; the reporting names Cloudflare Dynamic Workers as a particularly good fit and Cloudflare OS as a demonstration. The adjacent 'Small Software' framing comes from a Y Combinator general partner and a Y Combinator post, which is promotional for a fund's thesis and deal flow. Neither publisher discloses or examines these alignments, and the trade outlet even headlines Cloudflare's infrastructure interest without probing it.
Confident about the argument, weak on the world around it
Confidence is high that the essay exists, says what is reported, and circulated within a day, because two independent publishers converge on the quoted hypothesis. Confidence is low on everything that would make the thesis actionable: adoption is limited to three sparsely described artifacts from one outlet, the sole empirical security finding is unattributed, undisclosed vendor and fund incentives sit behind the framing, and no dissenting expert appears in a two-source cluster.
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1 article · August 19, 2026
1 article · August 19, 2026