Leadership1 publisher3 min readPublished
One phone call about an oversized order turned a hunting product into a garden business
The Federal Reserve says reaching customers is the top operational problem for small employers. One owner's account suggests part of that problem is detection, and the proximity that catches such signals is the first thing growth takes away.
The Board Room · Leadership desk

What happened
- The Federal Reserve's 2026 Report on Employer Firms, drawn from more than 6,500 small employer firms, names reaching customers and growing sales as the top operational challenge those firms face.
- A Maine seller of predator urine called a lawn and garden store whose spring order was too large for hunting season, and learned its customers were gardeners using the scent to keep rabbits off lettuce.
- That one call opened a second business he says he has run alongside the hunting line for four decades from 35 acres outside Bangor, Maine.
- He offers Novo Nordisk building Wegovy around off-label use of Ozempic as the large-scale version of building a second product around unintended customer behaviour.
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Why it matters
- constraint Detection here was a by-product of hand-filling orders, so the fulfilment automation that lets a firm serve more customers is the same step that removes the place where a mismatched quantity is visible.
- decision An owner staring at the acquisition problem chooses between buying more top-of-funnel demand and paying someone to ask an unexplained buyer why they bought, and only the second has a cost you can cap in advance.
- cost The calls that explain nothing still consume the owner's hours, and nothing in the record says how often an odd order repays the time spent asking about it.
- capability Where a second use already exists in the customer base, naming it converts an existing product into a new line without new development, which is what the Wegovy structure looks like at farm scale.
An oversized order was the first sign something was off. A lawn and garden store ordered far more predator urine than hunting season could account for, and the author's account in Entrepreneur says he called to ask why [4]. What came back was an entire customer segment he had been serving for years without knowing it: gardeners using the same bottle to convince rabbits that something with teeth was nearby [5]. He credits the catch to still filling every order himself at the time, where the mismatch showed up on a shipping label rather than in a dashboard, and notes that no customer ever wrote in to explain the new use [7].
The tradeoff is that hand-filling orders is a detection surface, and it is also a ceiling on volume. Any firm that grows past the founder's hands sells that surface for throughput, which means the question is not whether to keep filling orders yourself but whether anyone rebuilds the function deliberately: a threshold that flags an order out of pattern, and a person whose job is to phone the buyer. The account does not say he ever formalised it, and it puts no rate on how often an odd order turns out to contain a new market [16].
The whole account could be one lucky call in forty years, written up afterwards as a method [6]. That is fair as far as it goes, and the Novo Nordisk comparison the author reaches for has the same shape, since Wegovy is the case where building the second product around unintended use worked [11]. What survives the objection is the cost asymmetry. Buying more demand is an open-ended line item; asking one unexplained buyer why they bought is a phone call, and the customer, in both his case and Novo Nordisk's, got there first [12].
The two data points the argument rests on carry very different weight. The Federal Reserve's finding comes from more than 6,500 small employer firms [1]; the Small Business Expo survey behind the proximity claim comes from more than 380 owners, roughly seventeen times fewer [8][10]. In the smaller one, 86% named service, relationships, quality or expertise as their edge, which leaves no more than 14% naming anything else, price included [8][9]. It measures what owners believe distinguishes them, not what buyers were observed to pay for, and it does not establish that detection is what the Fed's respondents are missing when they say they cannot reach customers [15].
The diagnostic half of the argument is the more portable part. Mammals respond to scent and hawks respond to sight, so a cover scent that stops a fox at the henhouse does nothing about a bird overhead, and the business built a separate visual deterrent because the biology dictated it [13]. The office version is that a complaint about a confusing sign-up flow and a complaint about slow support arrive in the same inbox looking alike [14]. Both point at the same operating choice: this quarter a firm decides where the acquisition budget goes, and next quarter it discovers whether anybody owns the exception queue that the budget was spent instead of reading.
What to watch
- Whether the Federal Reserve's next employer-firms report splits the customer-acquisition problem into demand-side and detection-side components rather than reporting it as one category.
- Whether the Small Business Expo's proximity-as-edge finding is retested against customer-side data instead of owner self-report.
- Whether any operator publishes a conversion rate for anomalous orders reviewed by a human, which is the number this account does not supply.