The headline of more than $1.2 billion divided by 20 megawatts across a maximum term of twenty years annualises to about $3 million a megawatt-year, or $250 per kilowatt-month with the power included, which works out to sixty million dollars per contracted megawatt [1][9]. The $3 billion case does not improve on that. The 32 megawatts under the customer's right of first offer would take the site to 52, and $3 billion spread across 52 megawatts is $57.7 million each [5][2], within 4% of the base rate [3], so the expansion clause sells the same power at the same price. Whatever the customer gave up in that negotiation, it was not a scarcity premium.
Cash actually in the door is $10.6 million, being a $5 million upfront charge and a $5.6 million security deposit [6], which is 0.88% of the headline [4]. That is the honest measure of commitment to date, and it is the figure I would put next to the twenty-year revenue line rather than beside it.
Against that, the ASICs. CoinShares numbers cited in the report put the average cash cost of producing a bitcoin at $79,995 in the fourth quarter of 2025 while the coin changed hands between $68,000 and $70,000 [10], meaning the machines were manufacturing inventory 14% to 18% above the best available bid [5]; Hyperscale's own disposals, 150.5 BTC for close to $9.6 million [11], averaged $63,787 a coin [6]. Switching the site off [1] and selling the servers [8] pays before a single rack arrives. Or rather, the more interesting detail is that the machines kept running for the ten weeks between the June 23 signing and the September 1 shutdown [10], which reads less like conviction about hashrate than like a customer's construction schedule.
Scale keeps this modest. Twenty megawatts is 5.9% of the 340 megawatts Hyperscale says Dowagiac can eventually produce [7][7], and $1.2 billion is 1.7% of the more than $70 billion of AI and HPC contracts Hashrate Index counts across listed miners [13][8], a pool that includes IREN's $9.7 billion with Microsoft and TeraWulf's roughly $19 billion with Anthropic [12].
This is probably wrong in one direction or another, but here is the view: Luxor's Ethan Vera is right that these companies are being revalued as energy infrastructure [15], and chief executive William Horne is right that contracted power is the variable that moves the equity [16], while the thing being capitalised is a two-decade payment stream from a counterparty the filing does not name [2], secured at under a hundredth of its face. From here the outcomes diverge. The customer could exercise inside the two-year window, making Hyperscale a 52-megawatt landlord with the $3 billion case live [5]. The customer could defer, leaving Hyperscale holding a powered shell whose ASICs are already gone [8]. Or the hashrate drain continues, from about 1,066 EH/s to 940 EH/s across three quarters on Hashrate Index's series, an 11.8% fall [14][11], until revenue per hash recovers for whoever stayed. That last path is the one that falsifies the thesis, and it arrives as a bitcoin price durably above the cash cost of production, at which point Dowagiac's twenty megawatts were sold as floor space when they were worth more as hashrate.
