Build1 distinct publisher3 min readUpdated
Have I Been Flocked has turned scattered public-records releases into a cross-agency search layer for a network its vendor says covers more than 5,000 law enforcement agencies.
The Engineer · Build desk

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H.C. van Pelt has assembled 241,961,192 audit records from Flock Safety systems into a database that lets a driver check whether an operator entered their license plate into the system [1], covering searches involving 4,684,253 plates as of August 16th [2]. The reason to care is not the plate lookup; it is that the cross-agency accountability tooling now exists outside the vendor and outside the agencies, running on about $80 a month of hosting and infrastructure [3].
Do the arithmetic on that budget and it comes to roughly $960 a year [1] for about 3.0 million audit records per dollar of monthly spend [2], averaging about 52 records per distinct plate [3]. Flock, for its part, says its network serves more than 5,000 law enforcement agencies, produces billions of monthly plate reads, and includes audit trails and transparency portals [4]. Those controls depend on agencies retaining, reviewing and releasing useful records [5], which is exactly where the project inserted itself.
The records came from local governments that released Flock audit logs through public-records requests or transparency portals [6]. Normally those files sit scattered across municipal records systems, arrive as spreadsheets or PDFs, and cover one jurisdiction [7]. Combining them is the whole product: a driver can search across agencies instead of first identifying every department that may have touched the network [8].
The engineering discipline here is in what the project refuses to claim. It is searching the audit layer, not reproducing Flock's underlying store of vehicle images and location data, so it does not tell a driver every time a camera photographed a vehicle [9]. Records may include the operator, agency, stated reason, case number, search time and search type [10], but a hit does not establish that the operator was a police officer, that the owner was suspected of a crime, or that the query returned useful footage [11]. Organization, network and public audit logs each expose different fields; network logs may redact both operator and plate, and public-portal releases can contain even less [12].
A clean result proves correspondingly little. The project says few governments provide easy access to their logs, records are frequently redacted, and newly obtained files may document searches conducted months or years earlier [13].
The free-text fields are the reason the site needs its own privacy plumbing. Operator-supplied reasons may describe investigations, personal details or the activity that prompted a search [14], so the pipeline strips Social Security numbers, birth dates, phone numbers, driver's license numbers and street addresses using pattern matching plus transformer-based named-entity recognition, with manual intervention when needed [15], and does not save plates or terms entered by visitors [16]. Those same fields feed reports on searches tied to protests, religious gatherings, journalists, political organizing, immigration enforcement, training exercises and low-level offenses [17].
This is a one-developer project on community donations, fiscally sponsored by the Alternative Newsweekly Foundation while remaining editorially independent [18], and van Pelt also publishes investigations into Flock contracts, security practices and government use of the system [19]. It predates the current campaign, having offered plate searches and long-term tracking analysis by November 2025 [20]; the lookup is being promoted during the August 16th-22nd National Week of Action Against ALPRs [21].
Watch the file formats and redaction practice on the supply side, because network-log redaction of operator and plate [12] is the cheapest way for agencies to keep complying while making aggregation useless. Watch the disclosure lag too: a database whose newest files describe queries from years ago [13] is a historical record, not a notification system. And note the concentration risk in one maintainer at $80 a month [3][18] carrying the audit function for a network of 5,000-plus agencies [4].
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Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
Have I Been Flocked uses free-text fields to build reports identifying searches related to protests, religious gatherings, journalists, political organizing, immigration enforcement, training exercises and low-level offenses.
H.C. van Pelt's Have I Been Flocked? (@HIBFlocked) has assembled 241,961,192 audit records from Flock Safety systems into a searchable database, allowing drivers to check whether an operator queried their license plate.
As of August 16th, the database contained searches involving 4,684,253 plates.
Van Pelt says Have I Been Flocked's hosting and infrastructure cost about $80 a month.
Flock says its network serves more than 5,000 law enforcement agencies, produces billions of monthly plate reads, and includes audit trails and transparency portals. Flock markets its license plate readers as cameras that use AI software to turn plate numbers, vehicle descriptions, locations and timestamps into searchable evidence.
Those controls depend on agencies retaining, reviewing and releasing useful records.
Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Detailed but single-sourced and self-reported
The cluster contains one publisher and one article. Its claims are specific, internally consistent and unusually explicit about limits (log tiers, redaction, disclosure ceiling), and the underlying material is public-records output. But every headline figure — the 241,961,192 records, 4,684,253 plates and the $80 monthly cost — is the project's own disclosure with no independent audit, and Flock's counter-facts appear only as marketing claims. The article's citation of EFF's separate analysis of Flock audit data corroborates the general pattern but not this dataset's numbers.
Large ingested corpus, unmeasured user uptake
Supply-side adoption is real and quantified: a quarter-billion audit records aggregated from many local-government releases, a capability that already existed by November 2025, and a vendor network of more than 5,000 agencies generating the logs. Demand-side adoption is unreported — no visitor counts, lookup volumes, press pickup outside this single article, or evidence that agencies, journalists or courts act on the data — and the project explicitly does not retain visitor queries, so usage is unlikely to be published.
Slightly overstated framing, heavily caveated body
The framing device — one developer, $80 a month, 242 million records, an 'independent audit layer' for a 5,000-agency network — runs modestly ahead of what the dataset can support, since coverage is bounded by whatever agencies choose to release and a negative lookup proves nothing. The overstatement is small because the same report enumerates those limits at length, distinguishes camera sightings from database searches, and disclaims what a hit implies about the operator or the driver.
Advocacy timing and vendor marketing on both sides
Both principals have visible stakes. The project is donation-funded, fiscally sponsored, promoted during an organized week of action against ALPRs, and its maintainer publishes adversarial investigations into Flock — all of which reward scale claims and attention-generating reports. Flock's relayed statements about 5,000 agencies, billions of reads and built-in audit trails are marketing material serving a commercial interest in appearing self-policing. The single publisher discloses these positions rather than obscuring them, but no independent party audits either side's numbers.
Moderate — facts are clear, verification is not
Confidence is held down by single-publisher sourcing, self-reported metrics and the absence of any Flock response to the aggregation. It is held up by the specificity and internal consistency of the reporting, the fact that the underlying inputs are government-released public records, the project's documented predecessor state in November 2025, and the independently reported EFF audit-data work cited in the same piece.
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1 article · August 15, 2026