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Leadership1 publisher3 min readPublished

EU productivity has slid from almost 95 percent of the US level to 80 since 2000

A Foreign Affairs essay counts about 30 percent of the Draghi recommendations implemented by mid-2026 and argues that even full adoption would leave the gap open, because the barriers are Europe's own labor, tax and regulatory layers.

The Board Room · Leadership desk

Illustration accompanying EU productivity has slid from almost 95 percent of the US level to 80 since 2000

What happened

  • EU labor productivity was climbing toward US levels at the turn of the century, then reversed, and the bloc now sits 20 percent below the United States.
  • Only two of the world's 100 most valuable high-tech companies are headquartered in the European Union, and the bloc has no global-scale firm in cloud computing, online advertising, mobile devices or chip design.
  • France's Mistral is the only EU company still in the race to build the large language models behind the current AI surge, according to the essay.
  • The 2024 Draghi competitiveness report urged more public R&D investment and a capital markets union, and about 30 percent of its recommendations had been implemented by mid-2026.

Compiled by The Board RoomSomething wrong?How this is made

Why it matters

  • constraint A European buyer of cloud, online advertising, device or chip-design capacity is buying from outside the bloc, so sovereignty in those layers is a contract term negotiated with a foreign supplier.
  • decision Boards siting hiring or R&D in the EU have to decide whether to treat the competitiveness agenda as an input to the plan or as something that happens after it.
  • exposure An EU-only model-sourcing policy rests on a single company, so if Mistral is acquired, redomiciled or falls behind, there is no second domestic supplier to fall back on.
  • precedent Locating the cause in accumulated labor, tax and technology rules puts deregulation on the table as the next competitiveness lever, where spending programs have been the default instrument.

Take the implementation rate at face value and it dates the project. About 15 points of implementation a year is what the first two years produced, and at that rate the remaining 70 percent of the recommendations is finished around 2031 [22]. The pace will not hold evenly, because the measures that need no treaty change or unanimous consent go first and the contested ones queue behind them. So a company deciding on European headcount or an R&D site this quarter is planning inside a partly implemented agenda through 2028. The essay's own position is that the finished agenda would not revive competitiveness either, because the proposals do not reach the root cause [9].

The gap they are meant to close has been widening for a quarter century. The essay skips the year-by-year series and never says which year the trend turned. EU labor productivity was at almost 95 percent of the US level at the turn of the century [1] and is at 80 percent now, a loss of roughly 15 points of relative position [3].

The reason the author expects policy alone to fall short is the age of European corporate capital: the 50 most valuable EU companies trace their origins back more than 150 years on average [11]. Volkswagen is the worked example. It committed to an entirely new EV platform in 2015 and created the software subsidiary Cariad [12], and has sold approximately two million EVs since [13]. Cariad was reorganized multiple times, updates arrived late, and several executives including the CEO left [14]. Porsche took about $5 billion in electrification write-downs, and Porsche, Audi and Bentley all announced major delays to EV models and platforms [15]. Profits from VW's Chinese operations fell 80 percent in the decade to 2026 [16]. Group market capitalization fell more than 60 percent in real terms between the end of 2015 and the second quarter of 2026 [17]. The Financial Times reported that CEO Oliver Blume proposed shuttering four factories in Germany and laying off as many as 100,000 workers [18]. Stellantis took more than $20 billion in EV-associated write-downs in 2026 [19].

The sharpest comparisons in the essay are the author's own: the figures for Mercedes, down more than half since the end of 2015, and BMW, down almost 60 percent, are attributed to the author's analysis [20]. The counts are a different kind of fact, and they are checkable. The causal claim, that accreted labor and tax policy, red tape and technology regulation built the barriier, is argument resting on those counts [10].

For a decision taken this quarter, the essay's forecast is conditional and names no date: if the EU does not create the conditions for such companies to develop, it says, "the bloc's decline may become irreversible" [21].

What to watch

  • Whether the implemented share of Draghi recommendations moves past 30 percent before mid-2027, and which measures make up the increase.
  • Whether Mistral stays independent and EU-domiciled, given that the essay counts it as the bloc's only remaining large language model contender.
  • Whether VW proceeds with the four German plant closures and the job cuts the Financial Times reported Blume proposed.
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