Invest1 publisher2 min readPublished
Emerging-market neobanks give away up to 5% on forex to keep 1% to 2% on a swipe
Circle's USDC market cap reached about $75 billion in 2025 after 73% growth. Roughly 76% of the emerging-market digital banks routing dollars over those rails have yet to turn a profit on the customers they sign.
The Investor · Invest desk
What happened
- The fastest-growing digital banks in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia settle overwhelmingly in two coins, Circle's USDC and Tether's USDT, according to cryptobriefing.com.
- Rizon, Altitude, Fuse, Cleva, Plasma One and Kast are all built on stablecoin infrastructure, and Nubank, one of the largest digital banks anywhere, has integrated stablecoin functionality.
- USDT grew more slowly than USDC last year, the second consecutive year in which the smaller coin outpaced its larger rival in percentage terms.
- Circle has approval for an OCC national trust bank charter, the first granted to any major stablecoin issuer.
- Tether, long cautious about US regulatory engagement, plans a US-regulated stablecoin called USAT issued through Anchorage Digital Bank.
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Why it matters
- constraint Customer acquisition, compliance overhead and multi-jurisdiction friction all come out of the card fee before a digital bank earns anything, so signing more users in a low-revenue market does not on its own close the gap to profit.
- exposure Issuer balances depend on distributors staying solvent, and cryptobriefing.com allows that a wave of neobank failures would temporarily cut stablecoin demand in the affected corridors even while it judges the demand driver durable.
- precedent Choosing settlement rails becomes a licensing decision for the distributor once both candidate issuers are placing themselves inside US bank regulation.
- contradiction cryptobriefing.com names the issuers as the boom's beneficiaries, and it reports market caps and growth rates without reporting issuer revenue or breaking that growth out by customer type.
The saving a neobank advertises runs two and a half to five times the fee it keeps. Up to 5% of a dollar transfer goes to the customer as the reason to switch [6]. Between 1% and 2% of a card transaction comes back to the bank as interchange [5], and the ratio between those two numbers is the whole distribution economics [4].
The issuer is counted differently, in balances. Working back from the 73% growth rate, USDC stood at roughly $43 billion a year earlier and added about $32 billion over the twelve months [1][2]. The fiat-backed stablecoin market grew about 46% in the same year [3], so USDC's share of that market rose by roughly 18% in relative terms [3].
The sources do not say which customers the $32 billion came from. cryptobriefing.com credits USDC's faster expansion partly to Circle's regulatory positioning and fintech partnerships [14], a category broad enough to cover neobanks without naming them. The one corridor the publication describes in detail is Lipaworld's, moving cross-border payments into Kenya, where traditional transfer costs stay high [8].
Two developments would change the reading. Some platforms are shifting toward net interest income, subscription tiers and lending, and cryptobriefing.com says none of those has resolved the profitability problem [12].
The second is size. USDC's faster percentage growth has not taken the market cap lead, and cryptobriefing.com says it could eventually challenge it [14].
I think Circle's position is the stronger one, for a reason that has little to do with the digital banks themselves: the balances grew through a year in which most of the apps sitting on top of them lost money [1][4]. The claim is testable. If USDC adds another $32 billion in a year when emerging-market neobanks are closing, the corridors were not what drove the balances [2].
What to watch
- Any Circle disclosure of USDC balances by fintech partner, which would size the neobank contribution for the first time.
- The launch of Tether's USAT through Anchorage Digital Bank, and whether existing USDT distributors move balances onto it.
- A failure or funding shortfall at one of the named stablecoin-based neobanks, and whether balances in that corridor fall with it.