Security1 distinct publisher3 min readPublished
Stratus Security's CTO says the scanner his firm wrote for its own engagements pulled them out of one client's backlog, and the previous tester missed them because ticket comments are not in anyone's standard methodology.
The Watch · Security desk

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A password lands in a Jira comment because somebody was reproducing a bug, and it stays there, indexed and readable by everyone on the project, long after the ticket closes. Stratus Security CTO Colin Watson says his firm's scanner pulled thousands of those out of one client's tickets on his most recent engagement, and that the tester who held the account for the five years before had never noticed, because ticket comments are not in the standard tooling or methodology [3]. Watson declines to rank the hiding places and tells clients to check every service equally [4]. That is the honest version of the advice: a clean file share report is a statement about file shares.
The performance case is Stratus's own, run against its own tool on synthetic repositories on 24 August 2026, three runs per scenario [5][11]. Averaged, Sift finished in 12.42 seconds where Snaffler 1.0.244 took 34.18, and burned 62.11 processor seconds against 276.56 [9]. That is 2.75 times faster on the clock and 4.45 times cheaper in CPU [1][2], with average memory of 92 MiB against 337 MiB, a factor of 3.7 [10][3]. Divide processor seconds by elapsed seconds and you see how wide each tool ran: 5.0 for Sift, 8.1 for Snaffler [5]. Snaffler used more concurrency and still finished later. The widest single gap was raw throughput, 0.69 seconds against 6.32 on 5.5 GiB, about nine to one [7][4]. Treat the ratios as direction rather than measurement, with one point in Stratus's favour: it patched out Snaffler's once-per-minute completion check-in, which was the easiest available way to flatter its own numbers [12].
Throughput is unlimited by default, which is how a scan gets killed by whoever owns the file server; thread count and read rate are flags, and every scan writes checkpoints so an aborted run resumes near where it stopped [13]. False positive triage can be handed to a local model through Ollama, with no scan data leaving the machine [14], which is the correct default for a corpus that is by definition every password the client left lying around. Detection rules are plain JSON, and a custom rules directory replaces the bundled catalog instead of extending it [17], so a first custom rule quietly narrows the scan unless the defaults get copied in.
The maintenance question is not theoretical. Stratus ran a Snaffler fork before this and dropped it when the accumulated shortcuts became more work than a rewrite [15]. Watson's answer is that the firm uses Sift on live engagements and has reputation riding on it as it spreads [16]. That is a better answer than a roadmap, and it is still a consultancy's spare capacity.
Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
Sift is a free, open-source command line tool that searches for passwords, API keys and other sensitive data across local disks, Windows file shares, an entire Active Directory domain, SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams channel files, Slack messages, and Jira and Confluence.
Stratus Security, a penetration testing consultancy, built Sift for its own engagements and released it for free on GitHub.
Watson said the finding changed the advice his firm gives, but that no spots are a priority over the others: "we recommend they check all possible services equally."
Stratus ran Sift against Snaffler 1.0.244 on synthetic file repositories on 24 August 2026, three runs per scenario.
Scanning 250,000 small files took Sift 10.61 seconds against Snaffler's 25.48 seconds.
Pushing 5.5 GiB of content through took Sift 0.69 seconds against Snaffler's 6.32 seconds.
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Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Precise numbers, one interested source
The quantitative side is unusually well documented for a tool launch — Snaffler pinned at 1.0.244, three runs per scenario, a stated test date, wall clock and processor seconds, and both average and peak memory — and Help Net Security volunteers that Stratus even patched its comparator to remove an artifact that would have made Sift look better. All of it still comes from the firm that wrote the tool, measured on data that firm generated. And the detail the whole story rests on, five years of missed credentials in Jira comments, arrives as one sentence with no client, no date and no artifact attached.
Its maker, and no one else named
Public availability is real: the binaries are on GitHub for free and the consultancy uses the tool on live engagements, which is more than an announcement-only launch. Beyond that the record is empty — no second firm, no install or star count, no issue or contributor traffic, no client willing to be named. Unsigned release binaries put this at the stage where the maintainer has not yet done the paperwork of a widely consumed project.
Headline outruns what is checkable
"Thousands of credentials survived five years of pentests" is a strong claim resting on one remark from a CTO whose firm both found them and gives away the finder; the speed and memory ratios likewise come with the tool's author holding the stopwatch. The overstatement is bounded, though, because Help Net Security keeps discounting its own story — treat the ratios as a direction, the binaries are unsigned, consultancy-maintained tools quietly die — and because Watson refuses the obvious upsell of naming Jira the number one danger spot, insisting instead that every service be checked equally.
Free tool, paid practice
Two commercial engines drive this reporting. Stratus Security sells penetration tests; a free scanner branded to the firm is lead generation, and the anecdote that carries it says a competing tester missed for five years what Stratus caught on day one — the most flattering possible framing, sourced entirely to Stratus. Help Net Security's own interest is milder but visible: open-source tool coverage is a franchise for the outlet, and the piece ends with links to more of it and a newsletter pitch.
Internally consistent, externally untested
We can be fairly sure what was said and published: the figures are internally coherent, the arithmetic holds, and the caveats are on the page rather than inferred. We cannot be sure any of it survives contact with a real environment or an independent tester, and with a single outlet carrying the story there is no second account to check the first against.