One hash, two countries: Slovakia's new radars run the same code as a Russian system

A 40-character checksum printed on the type certificate for Slovakia's new stationary speed radar is character-for-character identical to one filed in Russia's state register of measuring instruments for the KORDON-V enforcement system ^[5][7]. According to Zive.sk, which verified the finding, that makes it near-certain the device now being tested on Slovak roads runs the same measuring software as the Russian system ^[13].

The paperwork trail is short. The Slovak Metrological Institute issued a certificate dated 30 June 2026 for a road speed meter called NERO R-ONE ^[4]. On the second page, point 13 gives the measuring software version as simply "5", and point 14 records its SHA-1 checksum: eda7d49e2749f84194cf8448081e870277f02033 ^[5]. In the Russian register, a document dated 31 December 2020 covers KORDON-V, used in Russia for the same job of recording speed and traffic offences ^[6]. On its third page, the software identification table lists the measuring program SimFWCordon_V version 5.0 alongside the identical SHA1 string ^[7]. Two approvals, two national authorities, six years apart, one checksum ^[15].

Why that is hard to argue with: a SHA-1 hash is always exactly 40 characters, and altering a single character in the input file changes the output completely ^[8][9]. Zive.sk puts the odds of two independently written programs producing the same SHA-1 value at practically nil, and treats a full match as a technical fact that the code is identical ^[10][11]. The string in the Slovak certificate is 40 hexadecimal characters, consistent with SHA-1 output ^[18].

The finding has clear edges, and the publication draws them itself. It does not establish that NERO R-ONE was built by Simicon in St Petersburg ^[12]. It does establish shared software, and Simicon is named as the maker of KORDON-V and the author of that software ^[14]. Zive.sk's point is that even if the hardware came from entirely different manufacturers, the software interior is common ^[17] - and that software is what reads the radar returns, processes speed data and assembles the evidence for fines ^[16].

This is the part worth copying. Until now the Russian-origin argument around these devices rested on visual similarity: the shape of the plastic housings, where the cameras sit ^[2]. That is the kind of evidence a supplier can wave away. Legal metrology, by contrast, forces regulators to pin down software identity in the approval file, because a speed meter's measurement chain has to be tamper-evident - which is precisely why both the Slovak and the Russian dossiers print a version number and a checksum in the first place ^[5][7]. Anyone doing supply-chain review on certified instruments can therefore compare hashes across jurisdictions without a teardown, a subpoena or a lab. In this case the tip came anonymously to several Slovak newsrooms and was verified from public documents ^[3].

Two things to watch. First, whether the interior ministry, which began the road tests under Matus Sutaj Estok, responds to the software question or only to the hardware question ^[1] - a denial about where the boxes were assembled does not touch the checksum ^[12][17]. Second, whether reviewers elsewhere start pulling the software identification tables out of their own instrument approvals. The technique generalises to any certified device whose approval file publishes a hash.