One investor's 2026 resolutions cleared 25% support at 125 companies

The unit of account in this argument is a 25% vote, and Smith's own description of what it buys is modest. He calls it a significant vote that sends a strong message to management and boards, indicating that many investors support the reform and that the board should address it ^[7]. Nothing at that level binds a company, so the case for keeping small filers eligible has to rest on what boards choose to do afterwards, and on that point the memorandum offers the proponents' account of their own work: McRitchie and Chevedden report that many companies respond positively and make at least partial governance changes in response to the issues they raise ^[8]. That account, from the proponents about their own work, is the softest evidence in the file.

Both sides will quote these figures, so they deserve a careful look. Chevedden filed more than 200 resolutions in 2026 ^[3], and 125 drew votes above 25% ^[4], which puts the clearance rate at no more than 62.5% of the slate ^[1]. The true rate among proposals that actually reached a ballot is higher, since some were challenged and lost at the SEC and others were withdrawn after discussions with management ^[5], but the record here does not say how many went to a vote. Anyone citing the 125 should say which denominator they mean.

The tally also comes with a provenance note that the memorandum itself supplies: the data was provided by Chevedden and cross-checked against ICCR's database ^[6]. Both are parties to the dispute. That is not a reason to set the number aside, but the board-deck version, "125 resolutions above 25%", leaves out that no independent tabulation is offered alongside it.

The skeptic's position is on the record from the regulator. SEC chair Paul Atkins, speaking to a company trade association, disparaged an individual investor who had filed over 200 resolutions, treating the volume as the objection ^[10]. Smith answers with a source from the other side of the aisle: in 2013, James Copeland of the free-market Manhattan Institute said Chevedden was leading the intellectual curve, getting proposals out before they started to get traction ^[11]. That assessment is 13 years older than the filings now in dispute ^[2], and it describes why volume exists in the first place, since a proponent with no institutional distribution gets read by filing widely rather than selectively.

The access argument most needs a documented link between votes and adopted practice, and the memorandum falls short of it. Smith writes that some proposed reforms have become established practices embraced by many businesses while others remain controversial ^[14], and he is explicit that not every proposal is wise for the company receiving it ^[17]. The reforms are described only in general terms, without a specific adopted reform named or an adoption count given ^[15]. So the documented stake is vote share, not standardised practice, which is a narrower claim than the one the process fight is usually argued on.

Texas is where the design choice lands. Its legislation allows companies to require that an investor hold $1,000,000 of stock before filing ^[13], and the SEC has discussed ownership thresholds that company trade associations support ^[12]. A floor set by portfolio size moves the screening decision away from institutional voters, who reject most of these proposals already, and to a point before the proxy is printed. Because the Texas provision is permissive, the 2027 season will show which boards adopt it and which prefer to keep taking the votes.