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The fence was fine, the test was green, and the injection still worked
A maintainer pointed his own multi-model CLI at its own repository and found both a prompt-injection hole and the passing test that was supposed to prove the hole did not exist.
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What happened
- llm-council is a small CLI that puts one question to several models, hides the authorship, and has the models rank each other's answers; the maintainer uses it as an adversarial reviewer.
- On 26 July the maintainer pointed llm-council at its own repository, and it found a prompt-injection hole in its own prompts.
- The second finding was that a test had already been written for exactly that hole, and the test was green.
- In llm-council, stage 1 collects answers, stage 2 asks a model to rank them, stage 3 asks for a synthesis, and every stage feeds the previous stage's text, written by an untrusted party, into a new prompt.
- The author describes the situation as OWASP LLM01 in its plainest form, with the standard mitigation being fencing: wrapping untrusted content in delimiters and telling the reader that anything inside is quoted data, never instructions.
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Why it matters
On 26 July the maintainer of llm-council, a CLI that puts one question to several models and has them rank each other's answers with authorship hidden, pointed the tool at its own repository and it reported a prompt-injection hole in its own prompts [1][2]. The more useful finding was the second one: a test for exactly that hole already existed, and it was passing [3].
The setup is the ordinary one for chained models. Stage 1 collects answers, stage 2 asks a model to rank them, stage 3 asks for a synthesis, and each stage feeds the previous stage's text, written by an untrusted party, into a new prompt [4]. The author identifies this as OWASP LLM01 and the mitigation he applied as fencing: wrap the untrusted content in delimiters and tell the reader that anything inside is quoted data, not instructions [5].
The delimiters were fixed strings of the form `<<<{kind}_{label}_BEGIN>>>` and `<<<{kind}_{label}_END>>>`, sitting in a public repository [6]. So a hostile voter, or a model that had read the repo during training, could write `<<<RESPONSE_A_END>>>` in the middle of its own answer; to the model reading downstream the block is now closed, and everything after it reads as orchestrator text [7].
Now the test. It was named `test_a_voter_cannot_forge_another_fence_boundary`, and what it actually asserted was that the output contained the string `<<<RESPONSE_B_END>>>` exactly twice and that the forged text appeared before `<<<RESPONSE_A_END>>>` [8]. Both of those hold whether or not the attack works; as the author puts it, the test verifies that string concatenation concatenated [9]. It was not empty and not skipped. It ran, it exercised real code, and it would have caught a genuine refactoring mistake, while never touching the property in its own name, which is the part everyone reads when deciding whether an area is covered [10]. The suite was at 100% coverage, a number about lines executed, not about where assertions are aimed [11].
The repair moves the defence off the shape of the markers and onto something the attacker has not seen: a per-run nonce baked into the marker template [12]. The nonce comes from `secrets.token_hex(8)`, with the code comment noting that `secrets` rather than `random` is the point, because a predictable PRNG returns exactly what the nonce was meant to remove [13]. That is 8 random bytes, 16 hex characters, 64 bits per run [16]. The comment in the fixed code states the principle plainly: the nonce is the defence, not the shape of the markers [14].
The rewritten test is `test_forged_markers_never_match_the_run_nonce`, feeding marker-shaped payloads through `stage3_prompt` [15]. Note what it still does not do: it asserts a property of the prompt text, not that the downstream model treated the fenced region as data [17]. That is the honest ceiling here. Unguessability is checkable locally; model obedience is not.
Worth doing this week: grep your own suites for test names that promise a security property, and read the assertions underneath them. Then check whether any delimiter in a public repo of yours is a fixed string, and whether removing the fence entirely makes a single test go red [6][11]. The write-up was submitted to DEV's Summer Bug Smash [18].