Gulf crude regains prewar volume by sending 40% of it around Hormuz

Take 100 barrels of Gulf crude and apply Kpler's ratios. Forty leave by pipeline as Saudi Arabia and the UAE make greater use of those routes ^[5]. Sixty cross Hormuz. If the August transfer rate held, more than 42 of those changed tankers offshore, leaving at most 18 that cross without an offshore transfer ^[2]. Before the war, 83 of every 100 crossed the strait ^[3]. "The recovery has reshaped regional oil logistics," Kpler said on Wednesday ^[4].

In barrels, Kpler's September floor of 16.5 million a day puts about 6.6 million on pipeline routes and roughly 9.9 million through the strait ^[4]. The pipeline share is 2.35 times its prewar level ^[5]. Those two pools carry different risks. The tanker barrels move through waters the U.S. military is protecting, and drones and missiles still hit ships there on occasion ^[9].

The pipeline barrels avoid the strait but depend on fixed assets on land. Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, founder and CEO of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, argued that Iran can still destroy oil infrastructure such as drilling and refining capacity ^[11]. He said Iran's attacks on U.S. bases and on Gulf cities and infrastructure were "far more consequential" because they highlighted the U.S. failure to mitigate or degrade the threat ^[19]. "So while the risk premium around oil flows may seem tolerable for Trump, the threats to energy production infrastructure in the Gulf remain significant," he wrote on X ^[12].

Iran's finances explain why that threat persists. With exports blockaded to essentially zero, Tehran has no oil revenue left to protect from a supply shock ^[7]. Washington tightened sanctions further last month, the currency has fallen to new lows, and President Masoud Pezeshkian has complained that the regime's money in China is blocked ^[17]. The brake on escalation is the retaliation Iran's own oil infrastructure would face from the U.S. and its Gulf allies ^[18]. Batmanghelidj said Iran had not waged a scorched-earth campaign but "may yet do so if the current situation persists for too long" ^[13].

The squeeze could bring Tehran back with more than the ceasefire offer Trump turned down ^[14]. Iran could instead go after onshore fields and refineries before the squeeze finishes ^[11]. Or Washington could move first, on the post-midterm timetable the Wall Street Journal's sources described ^[15]. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier and the USS Makin Island amphibious group, with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard, are heading to the region ^[16].

I think the risk is concentrated in the post-midterm window. A cornered Iran is one source of it. The other is a U.S. campaign that gives Tehran a reason to aim at the onshore assets now carrying four barrels in ten ^[5][15]. The view is wrong if renewed bombing draws Iranian fire only at ships while the Saudi and Emirati pipeline routes keep running at their current share.