The EUDI Wallet hands your KYC pipeline a signature instead of a document photo

Take the input first. What the wallet hands over is a signed attestation, a W3C Verifiable Credential or an mDL-style object issued by a trusted authority, with the holder choosing which attributes go into any given presentation ^[5]. Verifying it is signature validation plus a walk up the issuer chain to a registry of trusted issuers ^[6]. Nothing in that path resembles image capture, and physical security-feature detection has nothing left to inspect ^[7]. A manual document-review queue built to stare at ID photos will be very fast at reviewing zero of them.

One item on the post's requirements list constrains the design rather than describing it: revocation status has to be checkable without a synchronous callback to the issuer ^[10]. That rules out the obvious implementation. A verifier that calls the issuer at presentation time puts another organisation's uptime inside its own latency budget, and it tells that issuer which relying party is checking which subject. The post specifies the property; it leaves the mechanism that delivers it unstated.

The carry-over list is where I would push back. Fraud and risk scoring, AML and sanctions screening, case management and audit logging all survive, the post says, running against a different kind of verified input ^[8]. They survive as boxes on a diagram. Attribute-level selective disclosure means the relying party receives the claim it asked for and nothing more, in line with the data-minimisation principle the post ties to both AMLR and eIDAS 2.0 ^[9]. Any risk feature derived from the document image, or from fields you never asked for but always got, leaves with the image. Re-keying a scoring model onto a handful of asserted attributes is a modelling project, not an integration.

The deadline does less work than it first appears to. The December 2027 obligation, as the post states it, is that large regulated relying parties accept the wallet for authentication ^[3]. Acceptance is additive: it obliges a verifier path while leaving the existing stack in place. What would actually retire document scanning is AMLR's narrowing of permitted verification methods to eIDAS-notified national schemes, the wallet, or qualified trust services ^[4], and that reading is carried by this one post. The integration window is the tighter number. Wallets are expected to be available across Member States by the end of 2026 ^[2], which leaves twelve months to test against real presentations before the obligation binds ^[15], out of three years total since the regulation entered into force in 2024 ^[14].

The mapping in the post is to Hypersign, a DID Core and VC 1.1/2.0 stack with EdDSA/Ed25519, ES256K/Secp256k1 and BBS+ signatures, which the post says issues credentials aligned with the eIDAS 2.0 framework and the EUDI Wallet specification ^[13]. A feature list can claim alignment; only a conformance result proves it. For that claim to transfer to your build, presentations would have to verify against an actual national trust registry, and interoperability would have to be shown against a wallet reference implementation rather than against the vendor's own issuer.