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Two disclosed DoS techniques turn HTTP/3-to-HTTP/1.1 conversion at six major CDNs into up to 350x load on the origin, with no configuration change by the customer.
The Watch · Security desk

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Two disclosed DoS techniques turn HTTP/3-to-HTTP/1.1 conversion at six major CDNs into up to 350x load on the origin, with no configuration change by the customer.
Researchers have disclosed two denial-of-service techniques, collectively named CDN Tsunami, that abuse how major content delivery networks convert client-facing HTTP/3 traffic into HTTP/1.1 requests for the sites behind them, amplifying a low-bandwidth request stream by up to 350x against the origin [1]. The amplifier is the translation service the customer is buying, and the researchers say every mitigation they propose is applied at the CDN rather than at the origin website [2].
The work was evaluated against Alibaba, Baidu, Cloudflare, Amazon CloudFront, Fastly and Tencent [3]. All six were susceptible to the bandwidth variant; five were susceptible to the connection variant, with Cloudflare unaffected there because it buffers the complete request before opening a connection to the origin [4]. Both techniques rest on the same gap: the CDN speaks HTTP/3 to the browser but only HTTP/1.1 to the origin, a mismatch the team attributes to the fact that "CDNs do not support end-to-end HTTP/3" [5].
HTTP/3 Bandwidth Amplification (HBA) uses QPACK header compression. HTTP/1.1 has no equivalent, so the CDN expands each small index value back into a full raw header before forwarding, and a request costing the attacker a few bytes costs the origin the decompressed size [6]. Attacker-side bandwidth stayed below 500 Kbps against the three CDNs supporting the QPACK dynamic table and below 5 Mbps against the rest, while measured origin consumption exceeded 100 Mbps throughout [7] - a ratio on the wire of better than 200 to 1 in the first case [8]. Static-table maxima were Baidu 66.06x, Alibaba 65.8x, Tencent 54.08x, CloudFront 51.2x, Cloudflare 48.27x and Fastly 36.41x [9]. The 350x headline figure applies only to Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent, the three that support the dynamic table, measured at roughly 64 concurrent streams [10]; each advertises a 4KB table with a 3,072-byte maximum entry [11].
HTTP/3 Connection Amplification (HCA) goes after connection capacity. Five of the six CDNs open a backend HTTP/1.1 connection as soon as the HTTP/3 HEADERS frame arrives, before the body, and each multiplexed stream triggers its own backend TCP connection; slow DATA frames then hold those connections open as incomplete [12]. Against an Apache origin with a 300-second timeout and a 256-connection limit, four HTTP/3 connections of 96 streams each forced 384 backend connections [13], about 1.5 times the configured ceiling [14]. Fastly needed 48 connections of 8 streams because it caps backend connections at 10 per HTTP/3 connection [15] - the same 384 streams by another route [16]. Benign client response times reached 60 seconds on Alibaba and up to 90 seconds on Baidu and CloudFront, both returning 504 [17]; Fastly rose to 15 seconds with a 503 [18], and Tencent closed the client connection after roughly 10 seconds with no response [19].
Scope matters. No CVEs have been assigned and no in-the-wild exploitation is reported [20]. The experiments were self-bounded, with the origin capped at 100 Mbps and the attacker at 30 Mbps [21]. The precondition is a site on one of the six providers with HTTP/3 at the edge and no configuration change by the site [22]. The paper lists HTTP/3 as on by default at Cloudflare and CloudFront [23], but Cloudflare's documentation describes it as available on all plans with steps to enable it [24], and AWS documentation gives http2 as the default for new CloudFront distributions [25]. Check what your own edge is actually negotiating rather than trusting the default.
Watch which providers ship. Baidu and Tencent confirmed the reports and deployed the proposed fixes [26]; that leaves the other four in the tested set without confirmed fixes [27]. Watch also for any move toward end-to-end HTTP/3 to the origin, which would close the gap rather than patch it [5], and for CVE assignment, which is what most vulnerability management pipelines actually key on [20].
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Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
Researchers disclosed two denial-of-service attacks, collectively named CDN Tsunami, that exploit how major CDNs convert client-facing HTTP/3 traffic into HTTP/1.1 requests to the sites they front, amplifying a low-bandwidth request stream by up to 350x against the origin server.
The researchers say every mitigation they propose is applied at the CDN rather than at the origin website.
The attacks were evaluated against Alibaba, Baidu, Cloudflare, Amazon CloudFront, Fastly and Tencent.
All six CDNs were found susceptible to the bandwidth variant and five to the connection variant, with Cloudflare unaffected by the latter because it buffers the complete request before opening a connection to the origin.
Both techniques rest on the same deployment gap, in which a CDN speaks HTTP/3 to the browser but only HTTP/1.1 to the website behind it, a mismatch the team said exists because "CDNs do not support end-to-end HTTP/3."
HTTP/3 Bandwidth Amplification (HBA) uses QPACK header compression; because HTTP/1.1 has no equivalent mechanism, the CDN expands every small index value it receives back into a full raw header before forwarding, so a request costing the attacker a few bytes on the wire costs the origin the decompressed size.
Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Detailed measurements, single-outlet relay of one unlinked paper
The claim set is unusually specific for a disclosure story: per-provider amplification factors, attacker-versus-origin bandwidth, a named Apache configuration with the resulting 384 backend connections, per-provider latency and HTTP status outcomes, and an exposure scan methodology. The reporting also states its own limits - self-imposed 100 Mbps/30 Mbps caps, an untested scaling claim, no edge-CPU data behind the 64-stream peak - and independently checks the paper's HTTP/3-default premise against vendor documentation. What holds the score down is provenance: everything traces to one publisher relaying one paper that is neither named nor linked in the supplied material, with no primary document, vendor statement or replication in the cluster.
Broad latent exposure, partial vendor remediation, no observed exploitation
Adoption of the risk surface is real but bounded: 42,330 of 151,685 Tranco-derived subdomains on the six providers answered an HTTP/3 probe, and the probe only proves the edge speaks HTTP/3, not that any origin is exploitable. On the remediation side just two of six providers (Baidu, Tencent) are reported to have confirmed and deployed fixes. There is no CVE, no in-the-wild exploitation, and no attacked origin outside the researchers' own test setup, so uptake of the technique by anyone other than the researchers is unevidenced.
Headline maximum outruns its scope
The 350x figure that titles the story applies to only three of the six tested providers, at roughly 64 concurrent streams, and depends on QPACK dynamic-table support; the other three top out between 36.41x and 51.2x, and the general static-table maxima never exceed 66.06x. The measurements were taken under self-imposed 100 Mbps origin and 30 Mbps attacker caps, the paper's assertion that the attacks scale to higher-capacity servers is untested, the 64-stream peak is attributed to edge CPU with no CPU data, and the premise that HTTP/3 is on by default at Cloudflare and CloudFront is contradicted by vendor docs. Offsetting the overstatement: no CVE and no in-the-wild exploitation are claimed, the branded name aside, and the same report carries most of these caveats itself, so the gap is a matter of headline framing rather than fabricated substance.
Named-attack research incentive, provider silence, duplicated single-outlet relay
Two incentive structures are visible in the supplied material. The researchers publish under a branded attack name with a maximum-case headline factor and a comparison to the earlier CDN Judo work, which rewards emphasis on the largest number; the mitigations they propose all land on the CDN rather than the origin, so the fix burden falls on parties who did not author the paper. On the provider side only Baidu and Tencent are reported as confirming, while four providers - including the two largest by exposed subdomain count - are unreported, and the cluster contains no vendor statement to weigh. Publication incentive is also present in the duplicate delivery of the same article under a tracking-parameter URL. No sponsorship, funding or commercial relationship is disclosed in the sources, so this reads as ordinary disclosure-economics rather than concealed interest.
Internally consistent but single-sourced
Confidence rests on one publisher's report, duplicated, with no primary paper, vendor confirmation or independent replication available in the cluster. Within that constraint the reporting is self-consistent, numerically specific and openly flags its own limitations and one contradicted premise, which supports moderate confidence in the mechanics and the measured figures. It does not support confidence about real-world severity at higher-capacity origins, about whether the four silent providers are affected as described today, or about the state of remediation since disclosure.
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2 articles · August 20, 2026