The cushion here is roughly 175.4 million SOL. Divide the 176.29 million SOL in favour by the 67.0% of participating stake it represented and the total that voted comes to about 263 million, which puts abstentions near 20.6 million and the two-thirds bar at roughly 175.4 million [3][5]; the proposal cleared that bar by something under a million SOL, about a third of one percent of the stake that turned up [6]. Kraken's 8.92 million SOL of voting power was close to ten times that cushion [7]. Its late switch is what decided the vote.
The source material hands us a price without meaning to. If the network burns about 650 SOL a day at roughly $48,000, and the rejected fee proposal would have burned as much as 9,000 SOL at roughly $668,000, both pairs imply about $74 a token [12][1]. On that basis the 18.9 million SOL that will now not be created over six years [4] is about $1.4 billion of dilution avoided [2], a little over $230 million a year [3], and the sub-million-SOL margin that decided it was worth roughly $66 million [10]. A $66 million cushion setting a $1.4 billion parameter is the governance story here rather than the monetary one.
The more instructive result is the one that failed. SGP-0003, tracking Temporal's SIMD-553, would have split the transaction fee into an inclusion fee that still pays validators and a compute-linked resource fee destroyed outright [11], and it drew 142.84 million SOL for, 50.15 million against, and 72.03 million abstaining [10]. Strip the abstentions and support was 74.0% [8], comfortably over the bar it missed, because an abstention functions as a no [7]. It had already cleared code review from both client teams, Anza and Firedancer [13], so what defeated it was arithmetic about who bothered to hold a view. The burn it would have added, 8,350 SOL a day, comes to roughly 3.05 million SOL a year [4], within a whisker of the 3.15 million a year the disinflation cut removes [3]. Validators approved the deferred supply reduction and declined the near-identical immediate one, which reads either as a judgment about who pays or, the more interesting version, as the same denominator deciding twice in one afternoon.
My read, and this may be wrong: the supply change is small and legible while the payment change is large and soon, so stake behaviour matters more here than price. The 21Shares path takes gross staking yield from about 5.25% to about 2.25% within three years [8], a cut of roughly 57% in what securing the chain pays [9]. If demand does not arrive, 3.15 million fewer SOL a year is a rounding error against flows and nobody will be able to see the vote in the chart. If stake unwinds as yield compresses, 2029 arrives with a thinner security budget and the saving was a cost all along. And with the Constitution ratified and the process now written down [9], the floor and the date are parameters that a future two-thirds can revisit, which is where the price parts company with the value: holders are pricing a policy that the same 263 million SOL of stake can amend.
