Security2 publishers2 min readPublished
Poisoned Web-to-Lead submissions made Salesforce Agentforce leak CRM data past Trusted URLs
Zenity Labs found three Salesforce Agentforce bugs that let a planted sales lead drive zero-click CRM data theft and Slack phishing. Each attack began with one poisoned lead-form submission, and Salesforce fixed all three within 79 days of Zenity's report.
The Watch · Security desk
What happened
- Zenity Labs disclosed three Salesforce Agentforce flaws, which it calls SalesBleed, that let attackers hijack trusted agents for CRM data theft and phishing.
- Instructions hidden in a Web-to-Lead submission sat dormant until an employee asked an Agentforce agent to handle that lead, and then the agent carried them out.
- Two of the flaws came from weaknesses in Trusted URLs, the control meant to block Agentforce from displaying URLs and images from untrusted sources.
- The third flaw, in the Agentforce-Slack integration, let a hijacked agent post phishing messages to internal Slack channels under its own identity.
- Zenity reported the bugs on June 1, and Salesforce confirmed that all three had been addressed by August 19.
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Why it matters
- exposure Anyone able to submit a lead through a Web-to-Lead form could reach an Agentforce agent, so the pool of possible attackers was as wide as the form's audience.
- constraint Incident reviewers could not treat an Agentforce block notice as proof of containment, because Zenity saw that notice appear after the data had already left.
- exposure According to Zenity, one employee who enters credentials after an agent-sent phishing link could expose email, Slack, source code repositories and other apps tied to that identity.
- decision Salesforce's fixes cover three specific bugs, and Agentforce owners still have to decide which outsider-written records their agents are allowed to read and act on.
Rated on exploitability, SalesBleed was cheap. The attacker's outlay was one form submission. The trigger was an employee doing ordinary CRM work with an agent [3]. Zenity Labs classes two of the three bugs as zero-click data exfiltration [4].
The data left through an HTML image tag. A poisoned lead could read the leads and accounts tables, then use an image tag to send that data to the attacker's server [6]. Trusted URLs was supposed to stop Agentforce from sending data to unapproved domains. Zenity found it did not recognize top-level domains, and that character sequences could tamper with its URL parsing [8]. The agent's message to the user was also wrong. "Agentforce reported that the content had been blocked by the organization's security policies, even though the sensitive CRM data had already been transmitted to the attacker-controlled server," Zenity Labs wrote [7].
Slack link previews were a second exfiltration route. The same poisoned lead let an attacker reach the agent through Slack, and Slack fetches link information automatically to build previews [9]. "Specially constructed links can cause Slack to initiate requests that carry CRM data to attacker-controlled infrastructure as soon as the links appear," Zenity Labs said [10]. SecurityWeek files both exfiltration bugs under Trusted URLs and the third under the Slack integration. By that sorting, the preview route is a Trusted URLs failure delivered through Slack [c4, c5].
The phishing bug worked because the agent did not identify who was sending it messages [11]. "Employees receive a message from a trusted system already operating inside their workplace rather than from an unfamiliar outside sender," Zenity Labs said [12].
All three attacks begin with a Web-to-Lead submission. SecurityWeek describes that mechanism as a direct path into the CRM [c2, c9, c11]. The flaw class is an agent executing instructions an outsider wrote into a record [3]. The evidence covers lead forms only.
This is a researcher disclosure [1]. All three bugs were fixed within 79 days of Zenity's June 1 report [c14, d1]. SecurityWeek's report does not say whether anyone exploited them before the fixes.
What to watch
- A Salesforce advisory that assigns identifiers to the three SalesBleed bugs or tells Agentforce customers to change any configuration.
- Research testing whether outsider-written records other than Web-to-Lead submissions can carry dormant instructions that Agentforce executes.