Security1 distinct publisher2 min readPublished
Citizen Lab dated high-confidence Pegasus indicators on the phone to December 2025 and January 2026, long after Apple shipped the iMessage fix. At least 14 people in Serbia have been targeted this year.
The Watch · Security desk

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Zero-click means the target does nothing. The message lands and the exploit runs, so the only device-side defense is that the bug has already been fixed. In this case it had been. Citizen Lab assesses the iMessage flaw was addressed in iOS 18.4.1, which Apple shipped in April 2025 [3], while the high-confidence infection indicators begin in December 2025 [2]. That is roughly eight months between fix and earliest confirmed infection, nine to the January 2026 end of the window [14].
The findings as reported tie the exploit to a version rather than to a CVE [16]. There is nothing to match against a vendor advisory or a KEV entry, so the only check available to someone triaging a high-risk fleet is the OS version itself.
The second Serbian case takes patching out of the argument. A student movement member's Android phone was confiscated during police questioning and came back carrying a new build of NoviSpy [7]. Donncha O Cearbhaill, head of Amnesty International's Security Lab, said the forensic findings show these tools being installed while students are in detention [8], and that the 2026 strain was built with specific effort to avoid detection by researchers [9]. It was found anyway on a second device, for a reason no lab designed: private Viber messages from that phone were read out live on Informer TV, a pro-government Serbian channel [10].
SHARE Foundation counts at least 14 people targeted since the start of 2026, including activists, a member of parliament and an opposition local councilor [5], with the timing tracking the 29 March 2026 local elections [6]. Apple's latest mercenary-spyware notifications went to an unspecified number of users across 110 countries [4], which sets breadth without a denominator. The named mitigations are configuration rather than procurement: device updates and Lockdown Mode on iOS, Google's Advanced Protection Program [12], WhatsApp's Strict Account Settings blocking media from non-contacts [13]. The bill is lost functionality, paid by the user.
Serbia's record already included Cellebrite forensic unlocks used to plant NoviSpy [11]. The 2026 cases keep that method, harden the Android implant against detection, and add a remote iOS chain on top [15]. That reads as one operator maintaining a toolkit across two platforms.
Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
Citizen Lab, working with the SHARE Foundation, confirmed that an iMessage zero-click exploit was used to infect the iPhone of a member of Serbia's student protest movement with NSO Group's Pegasus spyware.
The SHARE Foundation confirmed that at least 14 people in Serbia have been targeted with advanced spyware since the beginning of 2026, including student movement members, activists, a member of parliament, and a local councilor from opposition parties.
Citizen Lab said it found high-confidence indicators of infection from a period across December 2025 to January 2026, and that this does not preclude the possibility of additional infections.
The zero-click exploit is assessed to have targeted Apple iMessage and to have been addressed by Apple in iOS 18.4.1, released in April 2025.
Apple sent a new set of threat notifications to customers it suspected may have been targeted by mercenary spyware; the alerts went to an unspecified number of users in 110 countries.
The timing of the targeting incidents coincided with local elections held in Serbia on 29 March 2026.
Distinct publishers with included, body-backed reporting in this cluster.
2 articles · September 3, 2026
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Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Named forensic labs, one narrating outlet
The weight of this story rests on device forensics from Citizen Lab and SHARE, quoted directly, with Amnesty International's Security Lab head corroborating the Android half on the record — that is unusually solid provenance for a spyware allegation. What holds the number down is everything left blank: the iMessage flaw is named only by the iOS version that fixed it, no CVE, no primary report reproduced, and no reply from NSO Group, Cellebrite or the Serbian government. Readers are trusting one publication's rendering of two other organisations' work.
Found on devices, counted by name
This is not a proof-of-concept write-up. Fourteen people in Serbia are confirmed targeted since January 2026 — students, activists, a sitting MP, an opposition councilor — with two infected devices carrying the same Android strain and one iPhone carrying Pegasus. Apple's own notification round reached 110 countries. Real deployment, then; what keeps this short of a high mark is that fourteen is explicitly a floor, the recipient count behind Apple's alerts is withheld, and only a handful of phones were actually examined.
Under-told rather than oversold
The writing is flatter than the facts warrant. Private messages from an activist's phone read out live on a pro-government channel, an implant installed while its owner sat in police questioning, an opposition MP among the targets weeks before an election — all of that is delivered in the register of a patch advisory, and the piece closes on generic hygiene tips rather than the eight-month gap between Apple's fix and the infection it failed to prevent. No claim here outruns its evidence; the framing simply undersells what the evidence shows.
Advocacy forensics, no rebuttal in the room
Every substantive finding comes from organisations whose purpose is documenting spyware abuse — Citizen Lab, SHARE, Amnesty — and their word choice reflects it: SHARE's findings 'prove' the pattern. That does not make the forensics wrong; it does mean the only voices present share an objective. The counterparties who would push back are all absent, and the closing recommendations quietly route readers toward Apple, Google and Meta product features, which is where the commercial interest in this story actually surfaces.
Solid facts, single channel
Where the story states something concrete — the infection window, the fourteen targets, the version that carried the fix — it is attributed to people who examined the devices, and we would expect those specifics to hold. Confidence stops well short of high because there is exactly one publisher between us and the forensics, the two copies we hold are the same text, and the untested parts of the account are the ones that would explain the incident: why an unpatched device, which flaw, and what any of the accused parties say.