The suffix on the role action is doing the load-bearing work. A holder of that custom role can grant tenant-wide consent for delegated and application permissions, but only for requests that satisfy the bound policy [3]. The check sits in the authorization path, not in a runbook the delegate is trusted to follow.
What you can write into that path is specific. Condition sets can key on the permission type, the resource application, named permissions, named client applications, and publisher status [5]. That is enough to express envelopes such as delegated Mail.Read and Files.Read against Microsoft Graph, selected application permissions on a single internal finance API, or delegated permissions from verified publishers with sensitive resources carved out [13]. The exclude set is the part that survives somebody later widening an include.
Precision has a bill. The policy names the exact delegated scopes and app roles the organisation considers appropriate rather than everything an API exposes [12], so the envelope becomes an artifact with an owner and an edit history, and its edit rate is governed by how fast agent capabilities change rather than by how many requests land in an inbox [11][14]. The approval queue does not disappear under this model. It moves upstream and turns into policy maintenance, which is a better place for it, because a policy edit is reviewable and a one-off approval mostly is not.
The alternative being argued against is well documented in the post: a small identity or security team validates the application, checks the requested permissions, finds the business owner, and approves or rejects [8]. Staykov's assessment of the usual relief valve is that it expands authority without making any individual consent decision more precise [10]. That matters because a tenant-wide grant can authorise an application to reach organisational data or perform privileged operations across the tenant, which is why the guidance he cites is to read the requested permissions before granting [7]. He frames the policy-bound role as a different idea from a reduced Global Administrator: delegate the decision without delegating the directory [15].
The maturity caveat is the delivery surface. This is a Graph-shaped operation, which makes it scriptable and diffable, and also puts it out of reach of any tenant without someone willing to write those calls. Those tenants will keep choosing between the queue and the broad role. It is also worth being clear about the evidence: this is one practitioner post, it offers no adoption figures, and it calls the control surface underused [15] without quantifying how underused. The mechanism is documented. The prevalence is not measured.
