Security1 publisher2 min readPublished
Botslab G980H dashcam firmware grants privileged commands to any holder of a guessable session ID
CISA lists 14 CVEs in two Botslab G980H dashcam firmware lines, including session flaws that can give an attacker on the camera's network privileged access. Botslab has not answered CISA, so operators have no fix date to plan around.
The Watch · Security desk

What happened
- CISA's advisory lists 13 CVEs against each of two Botslab G980H dashcam firmware lines, 14 distinct identifiers across both.
- CISA says successful exploitation could let an attacker bypass authentication, reach sensitive data and privileged functions, change configuration and disrupt the camera.
- CISA places the cameras in the transportation systems sector, deployed worldwide, from a vendor headquartered in China.
- Botslab has not responded to CISA's requests to work on mitigation, and the advisory's only remediation is to contact the company.
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Why it matters
- capability An attacker who gets onto a camera's network needs no stolen password, only a live session to target and a guessable identifier to reach privileged commands.
- constraint With Botslab not engaging CISA, an operator's plan to isolate or replace these cameras cannot be scheduled against a firmware release.
- exposure Exposure is limited to attackers who can reach each camera's local network, so control over who joins that network is the one control operators hold today.
The two firmware lines share 12 of their CVEs [4]. CVE-2026-79959 is listed only against 30010_QHG980HN5294SysFW+, and CVE-2026-88956 only against 58_QHG980HMCN5291SysFW+ [2]. Matching asset records to this advisory takes the firmware string as well as the model name [2].
Four of the flaws are in session handling, and they combine. The firmware does not tie an authenticated session to the client connection that set it up. Privileged operations check only that the requester holds a valid session identifier (CWE-863) [5]. Those identifiers come from a small sequential value space (CWE-340) [7]. According to CISA, an attacker with adjacent network access who knows a session is active could work out a valid identifier and use it to bypass authorization [7].
Sessions also outlive their connections. A new connection can displace the original client while the old session state stays valid until a separate expiry mechanism clears it (CWE-613) [6]. The identifier keeps working after its owner has been pushed off [6].
The fourth flaw is a second way in. The firmware accepts a reusable authentication value without checking its freshness or which client sent it. An attacker who captures one can replay it from another client to open an authenticated session [8]. Guessing needs only the knowledge that a session exists. Replay needs a captured value [7][8].
Adjacency sets the exploitability. CISA describes all four as usable by an unauthenticated attacker with adjacent network access [5][6][7][8]. As described, none of them works for an attacker who cannot first get onto the camera's local network. Once there, the attacker needs no credentials of their own [5][7].
What to watch
- Any response from Botslab to CISA, or new firmware for the 30010_QHG980HN5294SysFW+ and 58_QHG980HMCN5291SysFW+ lines.
- A CISA revision of the advisory that adds a fixed version or reports exploitation.
- Public proof-of-concept code for the sequential session-ID or replay flaws.