Leadership1 distinct publisher3 min readUpdated
The FBI's 2025 numbers match 1955, and nobody can say why. Baltimore is the one place with a measured mechanism, and its lesson is about targeting rather than spending.
The Board Room · Leadership desk

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Security budgets are not usually built from statistics. They are built from the last incident somebody on the board read about, and then inherited by insurance renewals and overnight staffing rotas. Gallup has been measuring that instinct since 1989, and in every year but 2000, 2001 and 2025 a majority told it crime had gone up from the year before [1]. In 2025, with the violent crime rate falling 9.7 percent [5], 49 percent still said there was more of it [2].
The awkward part for anyone planning against this is not that the public is wrong. It is that the people who track the numbers cannot say why the public is wrong. Adam Gelb of the Council on Criminal Justice and the analyst Jeff Asher, who spotted the decline before nearly everyone, both say there is no single explanation [6], and every leading candidate leaves a hole [7]. A trend without a mechanism is not a forecast. It will not underwrite a permanent cut to a protection line, and it does not promise the floor holds either.
Baltimore is the exception worth reading closely, because it produced something near a controlled test. The Group Violence Reduction Strategy started in the Western District in 2022 and nowhere else, which left the rest of the city as a stand-in comparison [17]. Over 18 months the number of people shot in that district ran about 30 percent below the comparison [18]. The detail to note is the arrest data: police made no more arrests overall, while arrests for serious violent crime rose 81 percent [19]. Same volume, different target set. That is a triage result, not a resourcing result, and it is the part of the story that transfers to anyone running a control function on fixed headcount. The looser citywide test, which put Baltimore's murder rate about 25 percent below a composite of other big cities, comes with the authors' own caution that too much changed at once to apportion credit [20].
The number that should govern a siting or staffing decision is not the national one. Baltimore closed 2025 with 133 homicides, its fewest since 1977 [9]. Against the roughly 600,000 residents the city counted in 2015 [11], that is about 22 per 100,000, roughly five times the national 4.1 [2]. The record national rate and the local rate answer different questions, and only one of them is on the lease.
If there is a measure to track instead of sentiment, the Baltimore evidence points at clearance. Criminologists have long held that the certainty of being caught deters more than the severity of the sentence [16], and Baltimore's homicide clearance reached 60 percent by mid-2026, with nonfatal shooting clearance at 54 percent, up more than 12 percentage points in a year [15]. Clearance is published, local, and moves within months. Perception is none of those.
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Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
The American murder rate peaked in 1980 at 10.2 per 100,000.
The FBI's estimate puts the 2025 American murder rate at 4.1 per 100,000, matching the rates recorded in 1955 and 1956 for the lowest ever measured in the country.
A team of economists and criminologists measured the Western District against Baltimore neighborhoods that had not started the program, and over 18 months the number of people shot there, fatally or not, ran about 30 percent below that stand-in; killings alone fell by a similar share but were rare enough that chance could not be ruled out.
In the Western District evaluation, police made no more arrests than before, while arrests for serious violent crime rose 81 percent.
Since Gallup began asking about national crime in 1989, a majority of respondents said crime in the US was higher than the year before in every survey year except 2000, 2001 and 2025.
In 2025, 49 percent of Gallup respondents still said more crime was happening.
Evidence-backed comparisons of source perspectives and observed adoption signals. Read the methodology
Which Builder, Operator, and Investor concerns the observed source mix emphasized—not a truth score.
Evidence, demonstrated adoption, hype gap, incentives, and confidence are assessed independently, each on its own current evidence. How these are measured.
Strong headline statistics, single publisher, unlinked primary sources
The core numbers are attributable to identifiable institutions (FBI estimate, Gallup series, a named prosecutor's office, a quasi-experimental evaluation) and the article names dissenting-caution voices rather than only boosters. But the cluster contains exactly one item from one publisher, no primary release or study is linked, the evaluating researchers are unnamed, and the article contradicts itself on the size of the violent-crime drop (9.7 versus 9.3 percent), which caps verifiability.
Real multi-year city deployment, one measured district, no replication shown
Adoption is concrete rather than announced: GVRS has run since 2022, Safe Streets longer, the prosecutor's office reports 2,129 convictions since 2023, clearance rates are tracked to mid-2026, and homicide counts fell across 2025 and into 2026. It is nonetheless confined to one city with a formal effect estimate for a single district over 18 months; the supplied material shows no other jurisdiction adopting the same package, so breadth is unproven.
Mildly overstated causal certainty on top of well-hedged reporting
The reporting is unusually restrained about causes — it says outright that no explanation holds and reproduces the evaluators' own attribution caveat — which keeps the gap small. It tips modestly positive because a single district's 18-month result is presented as the one place with a measured mechanism, killings alone were not statistically distinguishable from chance, the citywide 25 percent comparison is explicitly non-attributable, and per-capita context showing Baltimore still around five times the national rate is left out of the success framing.
Key figures self-reported by credited officials and agencies
Several load-bearing numbers come from parties with a direct stake in the result: the strategy is identified as the sitting mayor's, the conviction and incarceration counts come from the state's attorney's office, and the sub-100 goal is the police commissioner's own target. The article partly offsets this by quoting analysts who decline to claim a cause and by reproducing evaluator caveats, so incentive pressure is material but not unchecked.
Moderate: solid facts, thin sourcing base, contested magnitude
Descriptive facts about the national decline and Baltimore's counts are consistent and specific enough to rely on directionally, and the causal story is honestly hedged. Confidence is held to moderate by the single-publisher cluster, the absence of linkable primary documents, the unnamed evaluation team, the internal 9.7/9.3 discrepancy, and the derived per-capita figure that leans on a decade-old population denominator.
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1 article · August 22, 2026